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The Transformation of the Juvenile Court-
Part I: Race and the "Crack Down" on
Youth Crime
Barry C. Feldt
The public and politicians perceive a significant and fright-
ening increase in youth crime and violence. Concern about the
inability of juvenile courts to rehabilitate chronic and violent
young offenders while simultaneously protecting public safety
accompanies the growing fear of youth crime. Sensational me-
dia depictions of young criminals as a different breed of "super-
predators" further heighten public anxiety.' Frustration with
the intractability of youth crime fuels a desire to "get tough"
and provides the political impetus to "crack down," to transfer
some young offenders to criminal courts for prosecution as
adults, and to strengthen the sentences that juvenile court
judges impose on the remaining delinquents.2 Cumulatively,
these legal reforms have fostered a procedural and substantive
convergence between juvenile and criminal courts.
t Centennial Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. B.A., Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania; J.D., University of Minnesota Law School; Ph.D., Har-
vard University. This Article was originally presented at the Re-inaugural
Lecture as Centennial Professor of Law on September 8, 1998. I am grateful
to our former Dean, Bob Stein, who took a courageous administrative risk a
decade ago and enabled me to grow personally and professionally in ways that
neither of us could have anticipated. I want to thank Tom Sullivan for his ex-
traordinary support and encouragement since he became Dean. Although the
faculty had very high expectations for Tom when he assumed the helm four
years ago, his efforts on behalf of the Law School and the University have far
surpassed even our most wildly optimistic predictions. Finally, my wife,
Patty, brings joy, meaning, and purpose to my life. Her unconditional love
provides the foundation that makes all else possible.
1. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 3-16 (1998);
see also JAMES ALAN FOX, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRENDS IN JUVENILE
VIOLENCE: A REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL ON
CURRENT AND FUTURE RATES OF JUVENILE OFFENDING 2 (1996).
2. See Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems' Responses
to Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST. 189, 194-220 (1998) (analyzing recent
changes in juvenile court waiver and sentencing laws).
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In my inaugural chair lecture eight years ago, I identified
several then-emerging punitive policy trends that now have
come to fruition.3 These trends included procedural, jurisdic-
tional, and jurisprudential modifications of the juvenile court.
We have since witnessed further procedural convergence be-
tween juvenile and criminal courts; jurisdictional reforms that
divert noncriminal status offenders away from the juvenile
court and transfer increasing numbers of serious young offend-
ers to criminal court; and jurisprudential changes that de-
emphasize rehabilitation and escalate punitive sanctions for
ordinary delinquents.
Within the past three decades, judicial decisions, legisla-
tive amendments, and administrative changes have trans-
formed the juvenile court from a nominally rehabilitative social
welfare agency into a scaled-down, second-class criminal court
for young offenders that provides neither therapy nor justice.4
The great migration of African-Americans from the rural south
to the urban north that began more than three-quarters of a
century ago, the macro-structural transformation of American
cities and the economy over the past quarter of a century, and
the current linkages in popular and political minds between
race and serious youth crime provided the stimulus for recent
punitive juvenile justice policies.5 Two competing cultural and
legal conceptions of young people have facilitated the juvenile
court's transformation from a welfare into a penal organization.
On the one hand, legal culture views young people as innocent,
vulnerable, fragile, and dependent children whom their parents
3. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L.
REV. 691, 700-22 (1991) (summarizing the procedural and substantive conver-
gence between juvenile and criminal courts).
4. This Article continues that analysis and builds on my growing body of
research, including Criminalizing the American Juvenile Court, 17 CRIME &
JUST. 197 (1993) (analyzing changes in procedure, jurisdiction, and jurispru-
dence of juvenile courts) [hereinafter Feld, Criminalizing the American Juve-
nile Court]; Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile
Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141 (1984) (analyzing the procedural convergence be-
tween juvenile and criminal courts) [hereinafter Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile
Justice]; The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative
Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471
(1987) (discussing punitive policies in waiver statutes) [hereinafter Feld, Ju-
venile Waiver Statutes]; and The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense:
Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821
(1988) (discussing punitive juvenile court sentencing practices) [hereinafter
Feld, Punishment, Treatment].
5. See generally BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMA-
TION OF THE JUVENILE COURT 189-224 (1999).
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and the state should protect and nurture. On the other hand,
legal culture perceives young people as vigorous, autonomous
and responsible almost adult-like people from whose criminal
behavior the public needs protection.
The ambivalent and conflicted "jurisprudence of youth" en-
ables policy makers selectively to manipulate the competing so-
cial constructs of innocence and responsibility to maximize the
social control of young people. Over the past three decades, the
intersections of race and crime have provided the catalyst for
juvenile justice policy-makers to use these alternative con-
structs of youth to conduct a form of "criminological 'triage.' 6
At the "soft-end," juvenile court reforms have shifted noncrimi-
nal status offenders, primarily female and white, out of the ju-
venile justice system into a "hidden system" of social control in
the private sector mental health and chemical dependency in-
dustries. At the "hard end," states transfer increasing numbers
of youths, disproportionately minority, into the criminal justice
system for prosecution as adults. In the "middle," juvenile
courts' sentencing policies and practices escalate the punish-
ment imposed on those delinquents, again disproportionately
minority, who remain in an increasingly criminalized juvenile
justice system.
The relationships between social structural changes, race,
and crime account for many of the recent punitive changes in
juvenile justice policies.7 In the language of the social sciences,
the juvenile court constitutes the dependent variable and vari-
ous social structural, economic, racial, demographic, and legal
changes comprise independent variables. This Article analyzes
the transformation of the juvenile court from a social welfare
agency into a deficient criminal court. It links these legal
modifications to broader social structural changes and, espe-
cially, the racial-demographic changes and patterns of youth
crime that occurred in cities in post-industrial America.
A century ago, the processes of modernization and indus-
trialization fostered a particular ideological conception of
childhood and positive criminology which, in turn, encouraged
6. Id. at 7; see Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness,
Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 68, 74 (1997).
7. See generally FELD, supra note 5, at 189-244 (arguing that macro-
structural changes associated with deindustrialization of the inner city led to
the crack cocaine epidemic and increases in young black males' homicide rates
which, in turn, fostered punitive juvenile and criminal justice policies).
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the creation of the "rehabilitative" juvenile court. More recent
social structural and macro-economic changes provide the
catalyst to transform the juvenile court into a more punitive
agency. From its inception, the social control of ethnic and ra-
cial minority offenders has constituted one of the juvenile
courts' most important functions. At the turn of the century,
the Progressives created the juvenile court to assimilate, inte-
grate and control the children of the Eastern European immi-
grants pouring into cities of the East and Midwest. In post-
industrial American cities today, juvenile courts function to
maintain social control of minority youths, predominantly
young black males. Current punitive juvenile justice policies
reflect the changing character and complexion of juvenile
courts' clientele. Fear of "other peoples' children," especially
minority youths, motivates the transformation of the juvenile
court from a welfare agency into a second-class criminal court
for young offenders.8
The juvenile court's metamorphosis into a second-rate pe-
nal agency occurred so readily because of a fundamental flaw in
the underlying idea of the juvenile court. Juvenile courts at-
tempt to combine social welfare and social control functions in
one organization, but inevitably pursue both missions badly be-
cause welfare and crime control embody inherent and irrecon-
cilable contradictions. If a state separates social welfare goals
from criminal social control functions, then no need remains for
a separate juvenile court. Rather, a state could try all offend-
ers in one integrated criminal justice system. But children do
not possess the same degree of criminal responsibility as
adults. Adolescent developmental psychology, criminal law ju-
risprudence, and sentencing policy provide rationales to recog-
nize youthfulness formally as a mitigating factor when judges
sentence younger offenders. A "youth discount" provides a
sliding scale of criminal responsibility for younger offenders
who have not quite learned to be responsible or developed fully
their capacity for self-control.9 Formally recognizing "youthful-
ness" as a mitigating factor in sentencing will provide youths
with greater protections and justice than they currently receive
in either the juvenile or criminal justice systems. Uncoupling
social control from social welfare also would enable public poli-
8. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
9. See Feld, supra note 6, at 115-16.
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cies to address directly the "real needs" of all children regard-
less of their criminality.
This Article analyzes why and how the juvenile court has
changed so profoundly during the first century of its existence
and explains what sensible youth crime policies should be.
Part I briefly analyzes the social history of the juvenile court
and argues that the Progressive reformers who created the ju-
venile court deliberately designed it to discriminate against
"other peoples' children," a feature that carries over into con-
temporary juvenile justice administration. Part II analyzes the
"constitutional domestication" of the juvenile court. It places
the Supreme Court's juvenile court "due process" decisions in a
broader social structural context and argues that the Court
emphasized procedural safeguards as part of its broader
agenda to protect the civil rights and liberty interests of mi-
norities. Part III analyzes the impact of the juvenile court's
procedural revolution on its substantive authority. Policy mak-
ers have conducted a form of jurisdictional "triage," shedding
youths at both the "soft" and "hard" ends, and punishing more
severely those delinquents who remain within its contracted
authority. Part IV examines why the juvenile court's transfor-
mation occurred so readily. It contends that the juvenile
court's fundamental flaw is not simply a century-long failure of
implementation, but a failure of conception. The juvenile
court's effort to combine social welfare and criminal social con-
trol in one agency simply assures that it pursues both missions
badly. Finally, Part V contends that once a state uncouples so-
cial welfare from social control, then no need remains for a
separate juvenile court. It explores, on the one hand, how a
criminal justice system should respond to the youthfulness of
some offenders. It analyzes, on the other, how public policies
might more appropriately address the "real needs" of all
youths, regardless of their criminality.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE JUVENILE COURT
The juvenile court is the byproduct of changes in two cul-
tural ideas-childhood and social control-that accompanied
modernization and industrialization a century ago. 10 Economic
10. See generally JOHN R. SUTTON, STUBBORN CHILDREN: CONTROLLING
DELINQUENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1640-1981 (1988) (discussing the im-
pact of changing social construction of childhood on juvenile justice policies);
Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal
Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1085-
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modernization transformed America from a rural agrarian so-
ciety into an urban industrial one." Immigrants from southern
and eastern Europe and from rural America flooded into the
burgeoning cities to take advantage of new economic opportuni-
ties and crowded into ethnic enclaves and urban ghettoes. The
"new" immigrants' sheer numbers and their cultural, religious,
and linguistic differences hindered their assimilation and ac-
culturation, and posed a significant nation-building challenge
for the dominant Anglo-Protestant Western Europeans who
had arrived a few generations earlier.'2
Changes in family structure and function accompanied the
economic transformation from an agricultural to an urban in-
dustrial society, and the separation of work from the home pro-
duced a new social construction of children. 13 A reduction in
the number and spacing of children, a shift of economic func-
tions from the family to other work environments, and a mod-
ernizing and privatizing of the family substantially modified
the roles of women and children. 14 The idea of childhood is so-
1101 (1991) (analyzing the social construction of childhood and its impact on
juvenile justice treatment ideology).
11. See generally ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE
INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 101-36 (2d ed. 1977) (discussing the origins of
the Cook County Juvenile Court); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND
CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVE IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA
(1980) (discussing the social structural context of the Progressives' building of
social welfare and social control institutions); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH
FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 (1967) (discussing the impact of industrialization on
social institutions). On the role of developing social theories on criminal jus-
tice and juveniles, see also FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 25-41 (1964) and ELLEN
RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT
(1978) (analyzing the impact of social sciences on juvenile courts "rehabilita-
tive" ideology).
12. See JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
NATIVISM 1860-1925, at 87 (2d ed. 1988); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF
REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 8 (1955).
13. See Ainsworth, supra note 10, at 1094 n.68. Professor Ainsworth ex-
plains that a society is a composite of humanly constructed social artifacts, one
of which is the idea of "childhood." See id. at 1085-91. "[Tlhe life-stage we call
'childhood' is likewise a culturally and historically situated social construc-
tion .... The definition of childhood-who is classified as a child, and what
emotional, intellectual, and moral properties children are assumed to pos-
sess-has changed over time in response to changes in other facets of society."
Id. at 1091, 1093.
14. See CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 9, 178-209 (1980); JOSEPH F. KETT,
RITES OF PASSAGE: ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA, 1790 TO THE PRESENT 114-15
(1977); CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY
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cially constructed, and during this modernizing era the upper
and middle classes promoted a new ideology of children as vul-
nerable, fragile and dependent innocents who required special
attention and preparation for life.15
Modernization and industrialization sparked the Progres-
sive movement which addressed a host of social problems
ranging from economic regulation to criminal justice to political
reform.' 6 Progressives believed that professionals and experts
BESIEGED 6-10 (1977) (analyzing the effects on family life of the nine-
teenth-century emancipation of women and the growth of industrialization).
15. The idea of childhood specifies the social, cultural, and physical char-
acteristics that distinguish children from adults. See DAVID ARCHARD,
CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD 16-17 (1993). Within the past couple of
centuries, western societies began to differentiate the period between infancy
and adulthood, and to evidence greater concern for the welfare and rearing of
children. In CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMLY LIFE
365-404 (1962), Philippe Aries traced the modernizing of the family and child-
hood to the upper bourgeois and nobility in the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies when their indifference to their offspring began to diminish. Neil Post-
man in THE DISAPPEARANCE OF CHILDHOOD 37-51 (Vintage Books 1994)
(1982) noted that churchmen and moralists in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries advocated greater parental responsibility to raise their own children,
to oversee their education, to restrict their indiscriminate contact with non-
family members, and to protect their innocence. These changing views of chil-
dren and parental responsibility gradually diffused downward through the so-
cial class structure over time.
In the early nineteenth century, a newer view of childhood began to alter
child-rearing practices in America. By the end of the century, urban upper-
and middle-class parents invested far greater efforts to prepare their children
for adult roles and to restrict their autonomous departures from home. Degler
called the nineteenth century the "Century of the child," and attributed
change in child-rearing methods to the emerging perception of children.
DEGLER, supra note 14, at 71-72. Degler observes:
Children began to be seen as different from adults; among other
things they were considered now more innocent; childhood itself was
perceived as it is today, as a period of life not only worth recognizing
and cherishing but extending. Moreover, simply because children
were being seen for the first time as special, the family's reason for
being, its justification as it were, was increasingly related to the
proper rearing of children.
Id. at 66; see also KETT, supra note 14, at 111-43; Ainsworth, supra note 10, at
1091-96.
16. See generally HOFSTADTER, supra note 12; WIEBE, supra note 11.
Progressivism encompassed a host of ideologies and addressed a broad spec-
trum of issues. See generally, e.g., GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF
CONSERvATIsM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916, at
195-99 (1963) (economic regulation) [hereinafter TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM];
ROTIIAN, supra note 11, at 5-13 (criminal justice); HANS B. THORELLI, THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION (1954)
(antitrust). Progressives sponsored laws to regulate railroads, to restrict cor-
porate trusts and economic abuses, and to reform business practices. See gen-
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could develop rational and scientific solutions and that be-
nevolent government officials could intervene to remedy social
and economic problems. 17 Progressives attempted to "Ameri-
canize" the immigrants and poor through a variety of agencies
of assimilation and acculturation to become sober, virtuous,
middle-class Americans like themselves. 18 The Progressives
erally BRUCE BRINGHURST, ANTITRUST AND THE OIL MONOPOLY: THE
STANDARD OIL CASES, 1890-1911 (1979) (antitrust); GABRIEL KOLKO,
RAILROADS AND REGULATION 1877-1916 (1965) (railroad regulation); ROBERT
H. WIEBE, BUSINESSMEN AND REFORM: A STUDY OF THE PROGRESSIVE
MOVEMENT (1962) (business regulation). They legislated for urban public
health and welfare reform and to improve child welfare. See generally
SUTTON, supra note 10, at 130-32; SUSAN TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST INTEREST?
CHILD WELFARE REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 141-61 (1982); WALTER I.
TRATrNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL
WELFARE IN AMERICA 108-54 (3d ed. 1984). They introduced civil service and
"good government" reforms to limit the power of corrupt urban ethnic political
bosses. See generally SAMUEL HAYES, THE RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM,
1885-1914 (Daniel J. Boorstin ed., 1957). For our purposes, Progressive re-
formers embraced many "child-saving" programs to respond to the myriad of
threats to child development: inadequate and broken families, dependency and
neglect, poverty and welfare, education and work, crime and delinquency, rec-
reation and play.
17. Progressives invoked scientific rationality and claimed special exper-
tise to legitimate their programs and to expand their professional authority.
See BURTON J. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM: THE MIDDLE
CLASS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION OF AMERICA 85-92
(1976). Sutton states that:
[A] characteristic feature of Progressive movements was their ten-
dency to see social control not as a moral or political problem, but
primarily as an administrative problem. Progressives sought to de-
politicize the growing demands for the protections of a welfare state
by promoting reforms that emphasized administrative efficiency and
professional expertise rather than substantive changes in the alloca-
tion of rights and economic resources.
SUTTON, supra note 10, at 124. Progressives believed that they could solve
contentious social problems with rational and scientific methods, and at-
tempted to transform political and moral conflicts into technical managerial
decisions made by experts in administrative agencies insulated from partisan
strife. See TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM, supra note 16, at 2-3; ROTHMAN, su-
pra note 11, at 45-50. Progressives believed that neutral, detached experts
could apply knowledge rationally to formulate public policy without political
distraction. See SUTTON, supra note 10, at 127. They created governmental
agencies to implement their economic and social reforms, and enlarged and
expanded the power of the State. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
They felt that benevolent public governmental action could ameliorate the
dislocations of social change and provide a necessary counterbalance to the
power of private corporations.
18. Progressives sought to use the state to inculcate their values in others.
See ROTHMAN, supra note 11, at 45-50; cf ALLEN, supra note 11, at 129-30.
Rothman notes that:
The most distinguishing characteristic of Progressivism was its fun-
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coupled their trust of state power with the changing cultural
conception of children and entered the realm of "child-saving."19
Child-centered reforms, such as the juvenile court, child labor
laws, social welfare legislation, and compulsory school atten-
dance laws both reflected and advanced the changing imagery
of childhood.20
A more modern, scientific conception of social control-
positive criminology-attempted to identify the antecedent vari-
ables that caused criminality and challenged the classic for-
mulation of crime as the product of blameworthy, free-will
choices. 21 By attributing criminal behavior to external and de-
damental trust in the power of the state to do good. The state was not
the enemy of liberty, but the friend of equality-and to expand its
domain and increase its power was to be in harmony with the spirit of
the age.... The state was not a behemoth to be chained and fettered,
but an agent capable of fulfilling an ambitious program.
ROTHMAN, supra note 11, at 60. They viewed individual and social welfare as
co-extensive and saw no need to interpose procedural safeguards to protect in-
dividuals from state benevolence. See id. Although Progressives used modern
managerial techniques and organizational strategies, they derived their vision
for social reforms from an earlier, more homogenous and traditional society.
See id. at 9. A shared moral consensus and supreme confidence in their own
values sustained them. See id. at 60-61. They used governmental agencies to
assimilate and acculturate immigrants and the poor to become more like
themselves. See David Rothman, The State as Parent: Social Policy in the
Progressive Era, in DOING GOOD: THE LIMITS OF BENEVOLENCE 67, 79-82
(Willard Gaylin et. al. eds., 1981).
19. See ROTHMAN, supra note 11, at 205-12; see also PLATT, supra note 11,
at 43.
20. Many Progressive programs shared a unifying child-centered theme.
"The child was the carrier of tomorrow's hope whose innocence and freedom
made him singularly receptive to education in rational, humane behavior.
Protect him, nurture him, and in his manhood he would create that bright new
world of the progressives' vision." WIEBE, supra note 11, at 169; see also
LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCHOOL:
PROGRESSIVISM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION, 1876-1957, at 127-28 (1961) (com-
pulsory school attendance laws); KETT, supra note 14, at 215-44; TIFFIN, supra
note 16, at 187-214 (child welfare legislation); WALTER I. TRATTNER, CRUSADE
FOR THE CHILDREN: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CHILD LABOR COMMITTEE
AND CHILD LABOR REFORM IN AMERICA 120-21 (1970) (child labor laws).
21. Criminal justice and social control policies reflect underlying ideologi-
cal assumptions-unstated presuppositions, values, and beliefs-about causes
of crime and appropriate tactics and strategies to reduce it. See FRANCIS T.
CULLEN & KAREN E. GILBERT, REAFFIRMING REHABILITATION 27 (1982).
"These cultural patterns structure the ways in which we think about crimi-
nals, providing the intellectual frameworks (whether scientific or religious or
commonsensical) through which we see these individuals, understand their
motivations, and dispose of them as cases. Cultural patterns also structure
the ways in which we feel about offenders .. . ." DAVID GARLAND, PUNISH-
MENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 195 (1990). Classical criminal law assumed that
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terministic forces, Progressive reformers reduced actors' moral
responsibility for their crimes, employed medical analogies to
"treat" offenders, and focused on efforts to reform rather than
to punish them. A growing class of social science professionals
fostered the "rehabilitative ideal," which requires a belief in
human malleability and a consensus about the appropriate di-
rections of personal change. 22
rational, free-willed moral actors made voluntary choices to commit crimes,
and that they deserved prescribed consequences for their acts. See, e.g., id. at
28-35. The criminal law reflected a retributivist jurisprudence that blamed
and punished offenders for the quality of their choices, or the mens rea, rather
than attempting to affect their morality according to social utility. See id. at
61-66, 74-76.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Progressives refor-
mulated their ideology of crime, modified criminal justice administration, and
based social control practices on new theories about human behavior and so-
cial deviance. See ROTHMAN, supra note 11, at 52-61. Positive criminology
asserted that antecedent forces-biological, psychological, social, or environ-
mental---"determined" or caused criminal behavior. See id. at 50-52. Reflect-
ing the modem rationalizing tendencies, they sought scientifically to identify
the causes of crime and delinquency in order to prescribe an appropriate rem-
edy. See ALLEN, supra note 11, at 26; DAVID MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT
5-11 (1964). Positivism attributed criminal behavior to deterministic forces
that compelled the offender to act as he did, rather than to a deliberate exer-
cise of "malicious" free will. See MATZA, supra, at 12-21. Determinism re-
duced offenders' moral responsibility for their crimes, and penologists at-
tempted to reform them rather than to punish them for their offenses. See
FRANCES ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 3-7 (1981).
"The positivist model demanded consideration of each criminal's background
and personal traits as part of an intelligent disposition. It demanded a system
of individualized justice in which punishment and deterrence were of limited
relevance." RYERSON, supra note 11, at 22.
At the turn of the century, Progressive criminal justice reformers aspired
to scientific status and sought to strengthen the similarities between the
causal determinism of the natural sciences and those of the social sciences.
See id. at 101 (noting Progressives "helped open the way to a... 'more scien-
tific approach'"). In its quest for scientific legitimacy, criminology borrowed
both its methodology and vocabulary from the increasingly scientific medical
profession. See id. at 105-24. Just as germs caused diseases, deterministic
assumptions redirected criminological research scientifically to study offend-
ers in order to identify the causes of crime. See id. The ability to identify the
causes of crime implied the correlative ability to "cure" it through appropriate
interventions. See id. Medical metaphors-pathology, infection, diagnosis,
and treatment-provided popular analogues for criminal justice professionals.
See ROTHMAN, supra note 11, at 293-323. The medical model of criminality
emphasized diagnosis, prescription, and intervention to cure the problems of
each offender. See id.; see also RYERSON, supra note 11, at 105-24.
22. For example, Francis Allen has written eloquently of the ascendance
and decline of the "Rehabilitative Ideal" and noted its central assumptions:
The rehabilitative ideal.., assumed; first, that human behavior is
the product of antecedent causes. These causes can be identified....
[Vol. 84:327
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The juvenile court combined the new conception of children
with the new strategies of social control to produce a judicial-
welfare alternative to criminal justice, to remove children from
the adult process, to enforce the newer conception of children's
dependency, and to substitute the state as parens patriae.23
The juvenile court's rehabilitative ideal rested on several sets of
assumptions about positive criminology, children's malleability,
and the availability of effective intervention strategies to act in
the child's "best interests." Progressive "child-savers" de-
scribed the juvenile court as a benign, non-punitive, and thera-
peutic agency, although modern writers question whether we
should view the movement primarily as a humanitarian at-
tempt to save poor and immigrant children, or as an effort to
expand state social control over them.24 The legal doctrine of
parens patriae, or the State as "super-parent," legitimated in-
tervention and supported the view that juvenile courts con-
ducted civil rather than criminal proceedings. 25 Characterizing
intervention as a civil or welfare proceeding, rather than a
criminal prosecution, fulfilled the reformers' desire to remove
children from the adult justice system and allowed greater
flexibility to supervise and treat children. Because reformers
eschewed punishment, the juvenile court's "status jurisdiction"
Knowledge of the antecedents of human behavior makes possible an
approach to the scientific control of human behavior. Finally... it is
assumed that measures employed to treat the convicted offender
should serve a therapeutic function; that such measures should be de-
signed to effect changes in the behavior of the convicted person in the
interest of his own happiness, health, and satisfaction and in the in-
terest of social defense.
ALLEN, supra note 11, at 26.
A flourishing rehabilitative ideal requires both a belief in the malleability
of human behavior, and a basic moral consensus about the appropriate direc-
tions of human change. See id. at 26-27. It requires a cultural consensus
about means and ends and an agreement about the goals of change and the
strategies necessary to achieve them. See id. Progressives believed that the
new human behavioral sciences provided them with the necessary "technol-
ogy," the tools with which to systematically change people. See RYERSON, su-
pra note 11, at 99-136. They also believed in the virtues of their social order
and the propriety of imposing their middle-class values on immigrants and the
poor: "Progressives were equally convinced of the viability of cultural uplift
and of the supreme desirability of middle class life in cultural as well as mate-
rial terms.... The model was clear: all Americans were to become middle
class Americans." ROTHMAN, supra note 11, at 48-49.
23. See id. at 205-35.
24. See, e.g., PLATr, supra note 11, at 176-81; ROTHMAN, supra note 11, at
234-35; SUTTON, supra note 10, at 232-58.
25. See ROTIMAN, supra note 11, at 212.
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enabled them to respond to noncriminal behavior such as
smoking, sexual activity, truancy, immorality, or living a way-
ward, idle, and dissolute life.26 Juvenile courts' status jurisdic-
tion reflected the social construction -of childhood and adoles-
cence that emerged during the nineteenth century, and
authorized pre-delinquent intervention to forestall premature
adult autonomy and enforce the dependent position of youth.
Procedure and substance intertwine in the juvenile court.
By separating children from adults and providing a rehabilita-
tive alternative to punishment, juvenile courts rejected the
criminal law's jurisprudence and procedural safeguards. Pro-
cedurally, juvenile courts used informal processes, excluded
lawyers and juries, conducted confidential hearings, and em-
ployed a euphemistic vocabulary to obscure and disguise the
reality of coercive social control. Substantively, juvenile courts
imposed indeterminate and non-proportional sentences, em-
phasized treatment and supervision rather than punishment,
and focused on offenders' "real needs" and future welfare rather
than past offenses. Theoretically, a child's "best interests,"
background, and welfare guided dispositions, and a youth's of-
fense constituted only a symptom of those "real" needs.27 The
26. Conceived as a system of social welfare rather than punishment, juve-
nile courts brought within their ambit of control young peoples' behavior that
criminal courts previously ignored or handled informally. See PLATr, supra
note 11, at 46-74; SUTrON, supra note 10, at 121-53. This broader jurisdic-
tional definition included not only a child's criminal acts but her status or con-
dition of being, indeed, her entire lifestyle. Progressives used the status juris-
diction to legislate and regulate:
their preferences in the realm of manners and morals.... [T]he juve-
nile court reformers were placing their movement among a number of
others which were, in the progressive period, sending numerous mis-
sionaries from the dominant culture to the lower classes to accultur-
ate immigrants, to teach mothers household management and to su-
pervise the recipients of charity.
RYERSON, supra note 11, at 47. Thus, the status jurisdiction embodied the
newer cultural conception of childhood, further legally separated youths from
adults, and expanded state authority over child-rearing and family functions.
27. See Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107
(1909). Juvenile court judges imposed indeterminate and non-proportional
dispositions that could continue for the duration of minority. See THOMAS
BERNARD, THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JusTicE 90-96 (1992). "Indeterminate"
meant that the judge set no specific limit to the length of sentence; it could
continue indefinitely until adulthood. See Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra
note 4, at 848-50. "Non-proportional" meant that no relationship existed be-
tween what the child allegedly did and the length of disposition; the trivial or
serious nature of the offense imposed no limits in advance. See BERNARD, su-
pra, at 90-96. The particular reason or offense that brought a child before the
court affected neither the degree, the duration, nor the intensity of interven-
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juvenile court's rehabilitative ideal envisioned a specialized
judge trained in social sciences and child development whose
empathic qualities and insight would aid in making individu-
alized dispositions.28 Social service personnel, clinicians, and
probation officers would assist the judge to decide the child's
"best interests."2 9 Progressives assumed that a rational, scien-
tific analysis of facts would reveal the proper diagnosis and
prescribe the cure.30 Because the reformers acted benevolently,
individualized their solicitude, and intervened scientifically,
they saw no reason to circumscribe narrowly the power of the
state.31 Rather, they maximized discretion to diagnose and
treat and focused on the child's character and lifestyle rather
than on the crime.32
Despite their benevolent rhetoric and aspirations, however,
the Progressive "child-savers" deliberately designed the juve-
nile court to discriminate-to "Americanize" immigrants, to
control the poor, and to provide a coercive mechanism to distin-
guish between "our children" and "other people's children."33 In
their pursuit of the rehabilitative ideal, the Progressives situ-
ated the juvenile court on a number of cultural, legal, and
criminological fault-lines. They created several binary concep-
tions for the respective juvenile and criminal justice systems:
tion. See RYERSON, supra note 11, at 40. Each child's circumstances differed
and judges responded to "needs" rather than "deeds." Id. at 40-41. In theory,
every youth held the key to their own release from confinement or supervision
simply by reforming. Juvenile court jurisprudence rejected blameworthiness
and deserved punishment for past offenses in favor of a utilitarian strategy of
future-oriented social welfare dispositions. In theory, judges decided why the
child appeared in court and what the court could do to change the character,
attitude, and behavior of the youth to prevent a reappearance. See id.
It was a social welfare agency, the central processing unit of the en-
tire child welfare system. Children who had needs of any kind could
be brought into the juvenile court, where their troubles would be di-
agnosed and the services they needed provided by court workers or
obtained from other agencies.
BERNARD, supra, at 83. Courts decided each case on the basis of unspecified
"clinical" considerations that did not necessarily control the disposition of the
next case.
28. See RYERSON, supra note 11, at 39-40.
29. See id.
30. See ROTHMAN, supra note 11, at 56-57.
31. See id. at 59-61.
32. See RYERSON, supra note 11, at 42-43.
33. W. NORTON GRUBB & MARVIN LAZERSON, BROKEN PROMISES: How
AMERICANS FAIL THEIR CHILDREN 69 (1982) (describing the impact of selective
application ofparens patriae ideology in a class-based society); see also PLATT,
supra note 11, at 36-39; ROTHMAN, supra note 11, at 222-23.
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either child or adult; either determinism or freewill; either de-
pendent or responsible; either treatment or punishment; either
welfare or deserts; either procedural informality or formality;
either discretion or the rule of law. The past three decades
have witnessed a tectonic shift from the former to the latter of
each pairs in response to the structural and racial transforma-
tion of cities, the rise in serious youth crime, and the erosion of
the rehabilitative assumptions of the juvenile court.
II. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT
A. RACE, THE WARREN COURT, AND THE "DUE PROCESS"
REVOLUTION
During the 1960s, the Warren Court's civil rights decisions,
criminal procedure and due process rulings, and "constitutional
domestication" of the juvenile court responded to the broader
structural and demographic changes taking place in America,
particularly those associated with race and youth crime.34 In
the decades prior to and after World War II, black migration
from the rural south to the urban north increased minority con-
centrations in urban ghettos, made race a national rather than
a regional issue, and inspired the political and legal movements
for Civil Rights.35 The "baby boom" generation born after
World War II created a demographic bulge; rates of crime and
juvenile delinquency began to escalate in the 1960s as the co-
hort moved through the age structure. 36 During the turbulent
1960s, increases in youth crime and in urban racial disorders
provoked politicians' cries for "law and order" and encouraged
adoption of measures to "get tough" and to repress, rather than
rehabilitate, young offenders. 37
The migration of African-Americans from the rural South
to the urban industrial North and West in the decades before
and during World War II increased the urbanization of blacks
and placed the issues of racial equality and civil rights on the
national political agenda. More than three-quarters of a cen-
tury ago, World War I curtailed European immigration and
created a demand for black southern laborers to work in north-
34. See FELD, supra note 5, at 80-81.
35. See id. at 94-97. See generally NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED
LAND: THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION AND How IT CHANGED AMERICA (1992).
36. See FELD, supra note 5, at 80-81.
37. See id.
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ern industrial factories.38 During this same period, the mecha-
nization of cotton-picking and the Mexican boll weevil de-
creased southern demand for black workers.39 Because of the
historical relationship between blacks and cotton-picking both
during slavery and, subsequently, the mechanization of the cot-
ton industry constitutes one of the epochal events in American
social history. As indicated in Figure 1, between 1910 and
1920, more than a half-million blacks migrated to non-southern
states, followed by more than three-quarters of a million in the
1920s.40 Following the Depression and in response to rapid
economic growth following World War II, black migration from
the South soared.41
38. The outbreak of World War I in 1914 simultaneously increased the
demand for U.S. industrial production and reduced the availability of Euro-
pean immigrants to work in northern factories. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY &
NANCY A. DENTON, AMERIcAN APARTHEID 18, 26-28 (1993). Northern labor
recruiters importuned rural southern blacks to migrate at the same time that
the Mexican boll weevil invaded the South and devastated cotton production,
and the mechanical cotton picker decreased the demand for black tenant and
share-cropping farmers. See LEMANN, supra note 35, at 5-7; MASSEY &
DENTON, supra, at 27-29. Worsening economic conditions during the Great
Depression impelled an additional 400,000 blacks to leave the South for north-
ern cities. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra, at 43. "Push" factors, as well as
"pull" factors, motivated the black exodus: southern racial hostility, Jim Crow
laws, Ku Klux Klan violence, lynchings, poor segregated schools, and job dis-
crimination provided incentives to migrate. See LEMANN, supra note 35, at 14-
15. Although the Great Depression temporarily depressed the net emigration
of blacks from southern states, the opportunities to work in industries associ-
ated with war production during the 1940s induced more than 1.5 million
blacks to leave their rural homes. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra, at 45.
39. See LEMANN, supra note 35, at 14-15; see also MASSEY & DENTON, su-
pra note 38, at 27-29.
40. See also MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 38, at 29.
41. See LEMANN, supra note 35, at 16-17; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note
38, at 45 (noting that postwar economic growth encouraged "extensive black
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When blacks left the rural South, they moved primarily to
cities. 42 In the span of half a century, blacks shifted from about
three-quarters living in rural environments to three-quarters
residing in urban settings.43 As indicated in Figure 2, in 1910,
less than one-quarter of blacks lived in cities. By 1940, half of
blacks lived in cities, and by 1960, more than three-quarters
did. In 1870, 80% of black Americans lived in the rural south;
by 1970, 80% of black Americans resided in urban locales, half
in the North and West.44 When blacks moved to cities, they
42. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 38, at 18.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 18. During this massive migration, southern blacks poured
into Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia, Newark, and other northern, midwestern,
and western urban centers. See id. at 21, 45; see also LEMANN, supra note 35,
at 16. By World War II, the majority of blacks lived in urban America. See
LEMANN, supra note 35, at 6. During the War, twelve million men and women
entered the armed forces, and fifteen million civilians relocated for new de-
fense jobs. See FELD, supra note 5, at 85. From 1940 to 1944, war-time de-
fense contractors integrated their work forces and the black population in ur-
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lived almost exclusively in urban ghettos. 45 As racial diversity
increased outside the South, northern whites reacted to the
flood of rural southern black migrants with alarm and hostil-
ity.46 Threats, bombings, and violence reinforced racial dis-
crimination and segregation in housing, education, and em-
ployment.47 Enforced residential segregation laid the founda-
tion for the black ghettos that now exist in virtually every ma-
jor city.48
ban areas increased dramatically. See ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS:
BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQuAL 18 (1992).
45. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 38, at 44-45.
46. See id. at 29, 34.
47. See id. at 32-33. The black urban residential experience differed from
that of preceding generations of ethnic immigrants for whom ghettos provided
way-stations, places to adapt and adjust before moving into mainstream soci-
ety. See id. The black ghetto remained more racially homogeneous, concen-
trated, and impermeable.
48. See id. at 17-59.
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The post-World War II-era witnessed the suburbanization
of America, as whites simultaneously moved from cities to sub-
urbs and isolated blacks in blighted inner-city ghettos. Federal
housing and mortgage policies subsidized privately owned sin-
gle-family suburban homes.49 Housing contractors applied
49. In the period after 1945, suburbs surrounding major cities grew rap-
idly as federal housing policies and mortgages subsidized privately-owned sin-
gle-family homes. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE
WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON WELFARE 134-35 (1989). While the pros-
perity that fostered the baby-boom also sustained suburban growth,
"[g]overnment-guaranteed mortgages and tax deductions for mortgage interest
payments made new homes available to millions with little or nothing down
and low monthly payments .... Prosperity, easy credit, and a massive road-
building program also increased the number of automobiles," without which
the suburban lifestyle would not have been possible. Charles E. Strickland &
Andrew M. Ambrose, The Baby Boom, Prosperity, and the Changing Worlds of
Children, 1945-1963, in AMERICAN CHILDHOOD 533, 541 (Joseph M. Hawes &
N. Ray Hiner eds., 1985). The federal government cut mortgage subsidies for
the construction of rental units and the Federal Housing Administration "red-
lined" sections of cities threatened by the "Negro invasion" and reduced the
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mass production techniques to residential construction and
spawned "Levittowns'---suburban tract housing projects-as
they struggled to satisfy pent-up housing demand deferred
during the Depression and World War 11.50 Federal housing
and highway policies contributed to and favored the develop-
ment of predominantly white suburbs around the major cities
and encircled urban poor and minority residents.51 Industry
and employment opportunities began to move with the whites
on the highways and expressways to the readily accessible sub-
urbs.5 2
The great black migration increased the visibility and
awareness of the "American dilemma," and moved matters of
race to the center of the nation's and the Warren Court's con-
cerns about civil rights, crime policy, social welfare, and social
justice.5 3 Criminal justice reforms constituted part of the Su-
preme Court's broader constitutional program to protect the
rights of racial minorities.5 4 The synergy of campus youth re-
bellions, "baby boom" increases in crime rates, and urban racial
disorders in the 1960s precipitated a crisis of "law and order"
and brought issues of criminal justice administration and civil
rights to the legal forefront.55 During the 1960s, the rise in
availability of mortgage and home improvement loans there. See KATZ, supra,
at 135. Even as federal highway policy subsidized white dispersal, the loca-
tion of interstate highways disrupted many black communities and created
physical barriers to contain their expansion. See id. at 135-36.
50. See KATZ, supra note 49 at 134.
51. See LEMANN, supra note 35, at 118-19; see also MASSEY & DENTON,
supra note 38, at 186-216.
52. See LEMANN, supra note 35, at 118-19.
53. See id. at 6-7.
54. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
55. During the 1960s, urban riots rocked American cities as black Ameri-
cans reacted violently to decades of segregation, deprivation, social isolation,
and alienation. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 38, at 190. In the first
nine months of 1967 alone, 164 urban race riots occurred and augured the pos-
sibility of a national race war. See LEMANN, supra note 35, at 190. The Na-
tional Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, popularly known as the
Kerner Commission, attributed the riots to a legacy of racial discrimination in
employment, education, social services, and housing. See NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMHISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968). Established in the aftermath of
the mid-1960s urban race riots, the Kerner Commission warned that the
United States "[was] moving toward two societies, one black, one white-sepa-
rate and unequal." Id. Despite the historical prevalence and persistence of
black segregation and poverty, the Commission cautioned that continuing ex-
isting policies would "make permanent the division of our country into two so-
cieties; one, largely Negro and poor, located in the central cities; the other pre-
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youth crime and urban rebellion evoked fears of "'crime in the
streets." Republican politicians seized crime control and wel-
fare as wedge issues with which to distinguish themselves from
Democrats, and crime policies for the first time became a cen-
tral issue in partisan politics.5 6
The macro-structural, demographic, and political changes
eroded support for the juvenile court's rehabilitative ideal. A
flourishing rehabilitative ideal assumes human malleability,
the existence of effective techniques to change people, and a
general consensus about what it means to be rehabilitated.5 7
dominantly white and affluent, located in the suburbs." Id. at 22. The Com-
mission rejected a strategy of "ghetto enrichment" as a policy of "separate but
equal" that would institutionalize and make permanent racial divisions in
American society. Id. It proposed instead "a policy which combined ghetto en-
richment with programs designed to encourage integration of substantial
numbers of Negroes into the society outside the ghetto." Id. In AMERICAN
APARTHEID, Massey and Denton contend that public policies created and fos-
ter persisting residential racial segregation, perpetuate high levels of black
poverty, exacerbate the social and economic harms associated with racial iso-
lation and concentrated poverty, and maintain the urban underclass. MASSEY
& DENTON, supra note 38, at 9. In many respects, contemporary urban pov-
erty, youth crime and violence represent the culmination of social structural
processes predicted by the Kerner Commission.
56. Despite the sympathetic findings of the Kerner Commission, see supra
note 55, Andrew Hacker argues that the riots changed many whites' percep-
tions of the legitimacy of blacks' grievances and provided the context for ra-
cism in subsequent public policies:
Whites ceased to identify black protests with a civil rights movement
led by students and ministers. Rather, they saw a resentful and re-
bellious multitude, intent on imposing its presence on the rest of the
society.... As the 1970s started, so came a rise in crime, all too many
of them with black perpetrators. By that point, many white Ameri-
cans felt they had been misused or betrayed. Worsening relations be-
tween the races were seen as largely due to the behavior of blacks,
who had abused the invitations to equal citizenship white America
had been tendering.
HACKER, supra note 44, at 22.
The increased punitiveness of juvenile courts and the disproportionate
minority over-representation in the juvenile justice system constitute one
manifestation of these processes. The public and politicians support harsh,
"get tough" policies because they perceive young, urban black males as the ju-
venile crime problem. Similarly, Katherine Beckett argues in MAKING CRIME
PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS 83-88 (1997)
that race provides the subtext of the politicization of crime policies.
57. During the 1960s, a number of political and cultural forces combined
to undermine the Progressives' consensus about state benevolence, to erode
support for imposing middle-class values on others, and to question the desir-
ability of rehabilitation as a criminal justice goal and policy. See ALLEN, supra
note 21, at 25-41. See generally CULLEN & GILBERT, supra note 21. In turn,
the popular and political unraveling of support for rehabilitation and conser-
vative support for a "crack down" on crime and racial minorities encouraged
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Progressives believed that the new social sciences and the
"medical model" of deviance provided them with the tools with
which to reform, socialize, and acculturate the delinquent chil-
dren of the poor and immigrants to become middle-class Ameri-
cans like themselves. By the time of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in In re Gault,58 the Progressives' consensus about state
benevolence, the legitimacy of imposing certain values on oth-
ers, and what rehabilitation entailed and when it had occurred
had all become matters of intense dispute.5 9 The decline in def-
erence to professionals and concerns about the benevolence of
experts led to increased emphases on procedural formality, ad-
ministrative regularity, and the rule of law.
During the turbulent 1960s, several forces combined to
erode support for "state benevolence" and encouraged the Su-
preme Court to require more procedural safeguards in criminal
and juvenile justice administration: left-wing critics of rehabili-
tation characterized governmental and penal programs as coer-
cive instruments of social control through which the state op-
pressed the poor and minorities;60 liberals became disenchanted
the Supreme Court to impose due process safeguards in juvenile and criminal
justice to protect people from the State. See RYERSON, supra note 11, at 147.
58. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
59. The decline of support for rehabilitation mirrored a broader decline in
the legitimacy of public authority. See, e.g., ALLEN, supra note 21, at 34 (dis-
cussing the lack of political analysis in penal rehabilitation). In TWILIGHT OF
AUTHORITY 14 (1975), Robert Nisbet identified many social indicators of the
"crisis of legitimacy," including increased public hostility toward government;
the decline of political parties and public participation in the political process;
the erosion of patriotism; increased criminality and lawlessness. "I know of no
major poll that has not shown, over the past two decades, almost continuous
decline in popular trust of government and its leaders, in expressed confidence
in the political process, and in desire or willingness to participate directly in
this political process." Id. Although a decline in a sense of public purpose
pervaded many political and legal institutions, criminal and juvenile justice
systems experienced a precipitous loss of public and self-confidence because
Progressives had such high aspirations for them. See generally ALLEN, supra
note 21 (discussing the rehabilitative ideal and the decline and criticism of so-
cial purpose). Whereas a Progressive's claim of compassion legitimated a pro-
gram, by the 1960s, a bureaucrat's claim to act benevolently on behalf of a cli-
ent elicited primarily skepticism and closer scrutiny for self-serving interests:
"To announce that you are prepared to intervene for the best interest of some
other person or party is guaranteed to provoke the quick, even knee-jerk, re-
sponse that you are masking your true, self-interested motives." See Roth-
man, supra note 18, at 82.
60. See generally AdIERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR
JUSTICE (1971). Radical critics emphasized that no criminal justice programs
or reforms could ameliorate or avoid the inevitable consequences that flowed
from racial inequality and economic and social injustice in the larger society.
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with the unequal and disparate treatment of similarly-situated
offenders that resulted from treatment personnel's exercise of
clinical discretion;61 and conservatives advocated a "war on
crime" and favored repression over rehabilitation.6 2 In the
1960s, the issue of race provided the crucial linkage between
distrust of governmental benevolence, concern about social
service personnel's discretionary decision-making, rising crime
rates and urban disorders, the crisis of "law and order," and the
Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence.
The Warren Court's criminal procedure and due process
decisions responded to these ideological, structural, and racial
demographic changes, and attempted to guarantee civil rights,
protect minority citizens, and limit the authority of the state.63
See CULLEN & GILBERT, supra note 21, at 21.
61. Liberal disenchantment with the rehabilitative ideal reflected a
broader disillusionment with the ability of the State to "do good." See Roth-
man, supra note 18, at 82-84. Rothman also emphasized the "limits of be-
nevolence" and the failure of a paternalistic state to deal justly with its most
vulnerable citizens. Id. at 83-84. Liberals criticized correctional personnel's
exercise of clinical discretion, emphasized the unequal consequences received
by similarly-situated offenders, and questioned the scientific foundations of
"penal treatment." See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supra note 60, at
34-47 (discussing problems with the individualized treatment model).
62. Conservative critics advocated "law and order" and supported a "war
on crime." See FELD, supra note 5, at 106-07. They perceived a fundamental
breakdown of the moral and legal order in rising crime rates, civil rights
marches and civil disobedience for racial justice, students' protests against the
war in Vietnam, and urban and campus turmoil. See id. Conservatives at-
tributed crime and social disorder to a "permissive" society and advocated firm
discipline for the young, restoration of patriarchy in the family, respect for
authority, and an end to "coddling" criminals. See CULLEN & GILBERT, supra
note 21, at 12-13. Their efforts to "get tough" supported a succession of "wars"
on crime and later on drugs; longer criminal sentences; increased prison
populations; and disproportional incarceration of racial minority offenders.
See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 94-95 (1995). Political efforts to "get tough" on youth crime provide
the impetus to transform the juvenile court into an explicitly punitive exten-
sion of criminal justice policies. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
63. During the 1960s "Due Process Revolution," the Supreme Court re-
sorted to adversarial procedural safeguards and other judicial rules to limit
the state, to constrain discretion, and to protect peoples' freedom and liberties.
See FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 26-66 (1970). Several
threads weave through the fabric of the Supreme Court's due process juris-
prudence: an increased emphasis on individual liberty and equality; a distrust
of state power; an unwillingness to rely solely on good intentions and benevo-
lent motives; and criticisms of discretion in the treatment of deviants. See
FELD, supra note 5, at 94-97. The question of race unified all of these separate
strands. See id.
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In the juvenile justice arena, the Supreme Court's In re Gault64
decision mandated procedural safeguards in delinquency pro-
ceedings, such as notice, a hearing, the right to counsel, the
right to confront and cross examine witnesses, and the privilege
against self-incrimination. 65 Gault identified two crucial dis-
junctions between juvenile justice rhetoric and reality: the the-
ory versus the practice of "rehabilitation,"66 and the differences
between the procedural safeguards afforded adult criminal de-
fendants and those available to juvenile delinquents.6 7 Gault
demonstrated the linkage between procedure and substance in
the juvenile court, because engrafting some procedural re-
quirements at trial began to transform the court into a very dif-
64. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In re Gault involved the delinquency adjudication
and institutional confinement of a youth who allegedly made a lewd telephone
call of the "irritatingly offensive, adolescent, sex variety" to a neighbor woman.
Id. at 4. Police took fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault into custody, detained him
overnight without notifying his parents, and required him to appear at a juve-
nile court hearing the following day. See id. at 5. A probation officer filed a
pro forma petition that alleged simply that Gault was a delinquent minor in
need of the care and custody of the court. See id. No complaining witnesses
appeared and the juvenile court neither took sworn testimony nor prepared a
transcript or written memorandum of the proceedings. See id. At the hearing,
the juvenile court judge interrogated Gault about the alleged telephone call
and he apparently made some incriminating responses. See id. at 6. The
judge did not advise Gault of the right to remain silent, the right to counsel, or
provide him with the assistance of an attorney. See id. at 10. Following his
hearing, the judge returned Gault to a detention cell for several more days.
See id. at 6. At his dispositional hearing the following week, the judge com-
mitted Gault as a juvenile delinquent to the State Industrial School "for the
period of his minority [that is, until 21], unless sooner discharged by due proc-
ess of law." Id. at 7-8. If a criminal court judge had convicted Gault as an
adult, it could have only sentenced him to a $50 fine or two months imprison-
ment for his offense. See id. at 29. Gault, however, faced the possibility of
incarceration for up to six years, the duration of his minority because a juve-
nile court adjudicated him as a delinquent. See id.
65. See id. at 31-57; see also id. at 22, 24, 27 (discussing whether juveniles
should be afforded constitutional protection through procedural safeguards);
Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 4, at 169-90 (comparing and
contrasting the procedural rights available to delinquents and to adult crimi-
nal defendants); Francis Barry McCarthy, Pre-Adjudicatory Rights in Juvenile
Court: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 457, 459-
60 (1981) (discussing the limitations on juveniles' procedural rights); Irene
Merker Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights of Children Charged with
Crime: Proposal for a Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REV. 656,
662-63 (1980) (stating that constitutional protections should attach in pro-
ceedings that may result in incarceration of a child).
66. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 14-17.
67. See id. at 15-31.
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ferent institution than the Progressives contemplated. 68 Al-
though the Court did not intend its decisions to alter juvenile
courts' therapeutic mission, in the aftermath of Gault, judicial,
legislative, and administrative changes have fostered a proce-
dural and substantive convergence with criminal courts.
69
For most purposes, contemporary juvenile courts constitute
a wholly-owned subsidiary of the criminal justice system.70
Gault shifted the focus of delinquency hearings from a child's
"real needs" to proof of legal guilt and formalized the connec-
tion between criminal conduct and coercive intervention. Pro-
viding a modicum of procedural justice also legitimated greater
punitiveness in juvenile courts. It is an historical irony that
race provided the initial impetus for the Supreme Court to fo-
cus on procedural rights in states' justice systems to protect
minorities' liberty interests, those procedural rights escalated
the severity of sanctions, and now juvenile courts' increasingly
punitive sanctions fall disproportionately heavily on minority
offenders.
B. JUVENILE COURTS' PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES AFTER INRE
GAULT
The Gault decision represents a procedural revolution that
failed and that produced unintended negative consequences.
Delinquents, then and now, continue to receive the "worst of
both worlds,"7 1 neither the care and treatment juvenile courts
promise for children nor the criminal procedural rights pro-
vided adults. Shortly after Gault, the Supreme Court in
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania72 denied juveniles the constitutional
right to jury trials in delinquency hearings.7 3 Although the
68. See Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 4, at 161-63.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 71-77.
70. See Feld, supra note 6, at 90-95; Feld, Criminalizing the American Ju-
venile Court, supra note 4, at 254-55; Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, su-
pra note 4, at 272-76. For example, in In re Winship, the Court required
states to prove juvenile delinquency by the criminal law's standard of proof
"beyond a reasonable doubt." 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
71. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566 (1966) (stating that "the child
receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded
to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for
children").
72. 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (plurality opinion).
73. See id. at 550. The McKeiver Court departed significantly from its
own prior analyses in Gault and Winship which emphasized the dual func-
tions of constitutional criminal procedures to assure accurate fact finding and
to protect against governmental oppression. The McKeiver Court plurality de-
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McKeiver Court could deny delinquents criminal procedural
equality with adults, it could not compel states to deliver social
welfare services. As a result, delinquents experience punish-
ment without the customary criminal procedural safeguards.
Moreover, once states grant even a semblance of procedural
justice, however inadequate, they more readily depart from a
purely "rehabilitative" model of juvenile justice.
Procedurally, a substantial gulf still remains between the
"law on the books" and the "law in action" in juvenile courts.
States continue to manipulate the fluid concepts of children
and adults or treatment and punishment in order to maximize
the social control of young people. On the one hand, states'
nied that juveniles required protection against government oppression, re-
jected the argument that the inbred, closed nature of the juvenile court could
prejudice the accuracy of fact finding, and invoked the mythology of the sym-
pathetic, paternalistic juvenile court judge:
Concern about the inapplicability of exclusionary and other rules of
evidence, about the juvenile court judge's possible awareness of the
juvenile's prior record and of the contents of the social file; about re-
peated appearances of the same familiar witnesses in the persons of
juvenile and probation officers and social workers-all to the effect
that this will create the likelihood of prejudgment-chooses to ignore,
it seems to us, every aspect of fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and
of paternal attention that the juvenile court system contemplates.
Id.
Rather than identifying the affirmative protections that procedural safe-
guards provide, the Court in McKeiver emphasized the adverse impact that a
constitutional right to a jury trial would have on the flexibility and confidenti-
ality of juvenile court proceedings. See id. The Court feared that a jury trial
right would disrupt juvenile courts, substantially alter their informal prac-
tices, and bring "the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the ad-
versary system and, possibly, the public trial." Id. The Court realized that
the right to a jury would render juvenile courts procedurally indistinguishable
from criminal courts and raise the question whether any need remained for a
separate juvenile court. See id. at 550-51.
Ultimately, the McKeiver Court denied young offenders the right to a jury
trial in juvenile court because it adhered to the ideal of treatment of children
in a separate justice system. While the Court acknowledged the deficiencies
and disappointments of the rehabilitative ideal, see id. at 543-45, it did not
want to express its "ultimate disillusionment," abandon those concepts, and
return young offenders to the criminal justice system. Id. at 546. Critically,
however, the McKeiver Court did not analyze either the constitutional differ-
ences between treatment and punishment, or between youths and adults that
justified a different form of procedural justice for delinquents. Several recent
juvenile justice legislative reforms provide some youths with a statutory right
to a jury in order to expand the punitive sentencing options available to juve-
nile court judges. See Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case
Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1039 (1995)
(analyzing states providing juveniles with right to jury trial in order to en-
hance the punishment capacities ofjuvenile courts).
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laws and policies treat juveniles just like adults when formal
equality results in practical inequality. For example, almost all
states use the adult standard of "knowing, intelligent, and vol-
untary waiver" under the "totality of the circumstances" to
gauge juveniles' waivers of rights,74 even though juveniles lack
the legal competence of adults. Research on juveniles' waivers
of Miranda rights7 5 and waivers of their right to counsel pro-
74. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (discussing the need to
determine whether the accused gave a "knowing[]," "intelligent]," and "volun-
tar[y]" waiver of Miranda rights under the "totality of the circumstances"); see
also Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Courts: An Empirical
Study of When Lawyers Appear and the Differences They Make, 79 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1201-03 (1989).
75. Empirical studies of juveniles' comprehension of Miranda rights indi-
cated that most youths who received the warnings did not understand them
well enough to waive them in a "knowing and intelligent" manner. See Tho-
mas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical
Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1134, 1160 (1980) [hereinafter Grisso, Juveniles'
Capacities to Waive]; see also THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS:
LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE (1981); Thomas Grisso, Juveniles'
Consent in Delinquency Proceedings, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT
131 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983) [hereinafter Grisso, Juveniles' Consent].
Younger juveniles exhibited even greater difficulties understanding their
rights:
As a class, juveniles younger than fifteen years of age failed to meet
both the absolute and relative (adult norm) standards for comprehen-
sion .... The vast majority of these juveniles misunderstood at least
one of the four standard Miranda statements, and compared with
adults, demonstrated significantly poorer comprehension of the na-
ture and significance of the Miranda rights.
Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive, supra, at 1160; see also Rona
Abramovitch et al., Young Persons' Comprehension of Waivers in Criminal
Proceedings, 35 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 309, 318 (1993) (replicating
Grisso's study in Canada and finding that very few juveniles fully understood
the warnings and that the youths who lacked comprehension waived their
rights more readily); A. Bruce Ferguson & Alan Charles Douglas, A Study of
Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 39, 54 (1970) (finding that over 90% of
the juveniles whom police interrogated waived their rights, an equal number
did not understand the rights they waived, and even a simplified Miranda
warning failed to increase understanding). In sum, juveniles simply lack the
competence of adults to understand and therefore to waive constitutional
rights in a "knowing and intelligent" manner. Moreover, Grisso cautions that
research conducted under "ideal" laboratory conditions may fail to capture suf-
ficiently the individual characteristics, social context, and stressful coercive
conditions associated with actual police interrogation. See Grisso, Juveniles'
Consent, supra, at 141. Children's responses to hypothetical questions in a
relaxed atmosphere do not replicate adequately the conditions created by po-
lice who "can be gentle or tough, can explain the rights well or poorly, and in
many ways can exert varying amounts of pressure to comply." Abramovitch et
al., supra, at 319. Typically, delinquents come from lower income households
and may possess less verbal skills or capacity to understand legal abstractions
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vide compelling evidence of the persisting procedural deficien-
cies of the juvenile court.76 On the other hand, even as juvenile
than those in these studies. See GRISSO, supra, at 193-96. Children from
poorer and ethnic-minority backgrounds often express doubt that law en-
forcement officials will not punish them for exercising legal rights. See gener-
ally Gary B. Melton, Taking Gault Seriously: Toward a New Juvenile Court,
68 NEB. L. REV. 146 (1989). Immaturity, inexperience, and lower verbal com-
petence than adults make youths especially vulnerable to police interrogation
tactics.
Youths' social status relative to authority figures and police also renders
them more susceptible than adults to the coercive pressures of interrogation.
See GRISSO, supra, at 18-19. Most people believe that answering the police in
a respectful and cooperative manner will benefit them, at least in the short
run. Cf. Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Power-
lessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 319 (1993). Inexperienced
youths may waive their rights and talk in the short-sighted and unrealistic
belief that their interrogation will end more quickly and secure their release.
See GRISSO, supra, at 154-56. Many people from traditionally disempowered
communities, such as females, African-Americans, and youths, pragmatically
use indirect patterns of speech in order to avoid conflict in their dealings with
authority figures. See Ainsworth, supra, at 263-64. People with lower social
status than their interrogators typically respond more passively, "talk" more
readily, acquiesce to police suggestions more easily, and speak less assertively
or aggressively. See id. at 286-88. Thus, Fare's requirement that youths in-
voke Miranda rights forthrightly and with adult-like precision runs contrary
to the normal and predictable social reactions and verbal styles of most delin-
quents.
76. In the three decades since Gault, the promise of representation and
effective assistance of counsel still remains unrealized. See generally BARRY
C. FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE JUVENILE
COURTS (1993) (analyzing the impact of counsel in juvenile courts). In many
states, half or less of all juveniles receive the assistance of counsel to which
the law entitles them. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, A CALL FOR JUSTICE:
AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 19-27 (1995) (reviewing literature on access to
counsel and quality of representation) [hereinafter A CALL FOR JUSTICE];
KIMBERLY L. KEMPF ET AL., AN ANALYSIS OF APPARENT DISPARITIES IN THE
HANDLING OF BLACK YOUTH WITHIN MISSOUR'S JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS
95 (1990) (finding that lawyers represented only 39.6% of urban youths and
5.3% of rural juveniles); see also id. at 148-87 (noting that rates of representa-
tion differed substantially among judicial circuits and that judges removed a
significant proportion of youths who appeared without counsel from their
homes); Stevens H. Clarke & Gary G. Koch, Juvenile Court: Therapy or Crime
Control, and Do Lawyers Make a Difference?, 14 L. & SOC'Y REV. 263, 297
(1980) (finding that juvenile defender project represented only 22.3% of juve-
niles in Winston-Salem, N.C., and only 45.8% in Charlotte, N.C., in 1978);
Barry C. Feld, In re Gault Revisited: A Cross-State Comparison of the Right to
Counsel in Juvenile Court, 34 CRIME & DELINQ. 393, 399-403 (1988) (finding
that in three of the seven states surveyed in the mid-1980s, lawyers repre-
sented only 37.5%, 47.7%, and 52.7% of juveniles charged with delinquency
and status offenses); Feld, supra note 74, at 81 (noting that in Minnesota in
1986, a majority of all juveniles appeared without counsel). In 1995, the
United States General Accounting Office analyzed rates of representation in
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courts have become more punitive, most states continue to deny
juveniles access to jury trials and to other procedural rights
guaranteed to adults.77 Juvenile courts provide a procedural
regime in which few adults charged with crimes and facing the
prospect of confinement would consent to be tried.
certain counties in three states and found that rates of representation varied
among the states, within each state, and across offense and offense histories
within each state. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, JUVENILE JUSTICE:
REPRESENTATION RATES VARIED AS Dm COUNSEL'S IMPACT ON COURT
OUTCOMES 11-13 (1995).
The American Bar Association published two reports on the legal needs of
young people. In AMERICA'S CHILDREN AT RISK 60 (1993), the American Bar
Association reported that "[mlany children go through the juvenile justice sys-
tem without the benefit of legal counsel. Among those who do have counsel,
some are represented by counsel who are untrained in the complexities of rep-
resenting juveniles and fail to provide 'competent' representation." In a sec-
ond study, A CALL FOR JUSTICE, supra, at 22-23, the American Bar Associa-
tion focused on the quality of lawyers in juvenile courts and reported that the
conditions under which lawyers worked in juvenile courts often significantly
compromised youths' interests and left many of them literally defenseless. De-
fense lawyer-respondents also reported that many youths waived counsel and
appeared in juvenile courts without representation. See id. at 7.
Whatever the reasons and despite Gaults promise of counsel, many juve-
niles never see a lawyer, waive their right to counsel without consulting with
an attorney, fail to appreciate the legal consequences of relinquishing counsel,
and face the power of the State without professional assistance. See FELD,
Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 4, at 190. Waiver of counsel consti-
tutes the most common explanation why so many youths appear without a
lawyer. See generally GRISSO, supra note 75, at 131-60. As with waivers of
Miranda rights, most jurisdictions use the adult legal standard to assess
whether a juvenile "knowingly and voluntarily" decided to waive counsel un-
der the "totality-of-the-circumstances." See Fare, 442 U.S. at 725; see also
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-69 (1938) (requiring that the accused
prove that he did not "competently and intelligently" waive counsel to meet
the burden of proof in a habeas corpus action). In Faretta v. California, the
Supreme Court held that an adult defendant in a state criminal trial had a
constitutional right to proceed without counsel if he or she voluntarily and in-
telligently elects to do so. 422 U.S. 806 (1975). By endorsing the adult "total-
ity" test as the standard by which to evaluate juveniles' waivers of rights, Fare
eroded Progressives' "protectionist" assumption that children differ from
adults and that courts should treat them more solicitously. Fare, 442 U.S. at
725. Faretta and Fare allow juveniles to waive counsel, presume that youths
possess the same degree of autonomy and competence as adult defendants,
and permit and encourage youths to make legal decisions that ultimately re-
dound to their detriment.
77. See Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 4, at 903-07 (discussing
the issues surrounding allowing jury trials in delinquency proceedings); Feld,
supra note 73, at 1099-1108 (discussing the right to a jury trial and sur-
rounding case precedents).
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III. CRIMINOLOGICAL TRIAGE
Despite their continuing procedural deficiencies, juvenile
courts' increased formality have provided the impetus to adopt
substantive "criminological triage" policies. This process en-
tails diverting status offenders out of the juvenile system at the
"soft' end, waiving serious young offenders for adult criminal
prosecution at the "hard" end, and punishing more severely the
residual, middle-range of ordinary delinquent offenders.
A. STATUS OFFENSES
At the "soft" end, critics of juvenile court's status jurisdic-
tion focused on its adverse impact on children, its disabling ef-
fects on the families, schools, and other agencies that referred
noncriminal offenders to court, and the legal and administra-
tive issues it raised for juvenile courts.78 Judicial and legisla-
78. Beginning in the 1970s, many professional groups re-examined juve-
nile courts' status jurisdiction and most recommended limitations on the
grounds for and intensity of judicial intervention, administrative reforms, or
its elimination. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NEITHER
ANGELS NOR THIEVES: STUDIES IN DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS
OFFENDERS (Joel F. Handler & Julie Zatz eds., 1982) [hereinafter NEITHER
ANGELS NOR THIEVES]; National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Jurisdic-
tion over Status Offenses Should be Removed from the Juvenile Court: A Policy
Statement, 21 CRIME & DELINQ. 97 (1975). Ajoint commission of the Institute
of Judicial Administration and the American Bar Association, for example,
proposed that "the present jurisdiction of the juvenile court over noncriminal
behavior-the status offense jurisdiction-should be cut short and a system of
voluntary referral to services provided outside the juvenile justice system
adopted in its stead." INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. & AMERICAN BAR ASSN,
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS RELATING TO NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR 2
(1982). Most reform proposals emphasized youths' voluntary participation in
programs and services provided by personnel who are not associated with the
juvenile justice process.
Critics of status jurisdiction emphasize the negative effects of coercive in-
tervention on noncriminal youths, their families, and the juvenile court itself.
See, e.g., H. TED RUBIN, JUVENILE JUSTICE: POLICY, PRACTICE, AND LAW 56-
58 (2d ed. 1985); Al Katz & Lee E. Teitelbaum, PINS Jurisdiction, the Vague-
ness Doctrine, and the Rule of Law, 53 IND. L.J. 1, 27-33 (1977-1978); Irene
Merker Rosenberg, Juvenile Status Offender Statutes-New Perspectives on an
Old Problem, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283, 283-85 (1982); R. Hale Andrews, Jr.
& Andrew H. Cohn, Note, Ungovernability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction, 83
YALE L.J. 1383, 1405-07 (1974). Some critics argue that status intervention is
a one-sided effort by parents and courts to impose a particular standard of be-
havior on young people, especially young women. See, e.g., MEDA CHESNEY-
LIND & RANDALL G. SHELDEN, GIRLS, DELINQUENCY, AND JUVENILE JUSTICE
124-91 (2d ed. 1998); Irene M. Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, The Legacy of
the Stubborn and Rebellious Son, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1097, 1128-29 (1976).
Others characterize it as a chimera of assistance that promises impoverished
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tive disillusionment with juvenile courts' responses to non-
criminal youths have led to diversion, deinstitutionalization,
and decriminalization reforms.7 9  Deinstitutionalization re-
parents access to social and clinical resources but consigns problem children to
custodial institutions. See Andrews & Cohn, supra, at 1393-97. On the other
hand, defenders of juvenile courts' jurisdiction over noncriminal youths' mis-
conduct emphasize that the state cannot remain indifferent to family dysfunc-
tion, truancy, or premature and self-injurious autonomy, and that the commu-
nity needs some mechanism to intervene authoritatively when a child is "out
of control." See Lindsay G. Arthur, Status Offenders Need a Court of Last Re-
sort, 57 B.U. L. REV. 631, 631-38 (1977); Judge Leonard P. Edwards, The Ju-
venile Court and the Role of the Juvenile Court Judge, 43 Juv. & FAM. CT. J.,
Spring 1992, at 20-21. The vigorous debate about the scope of status jurisdic-
tion reflects competing cultural and legal visions of young people as vulnerable
and dependent or as autonomous and responsible.
79. The re-examination of status offenses accompanied the decline of the
rehabilitative ideal and the increased procedural formality associated with
delinquency proceedings, and reflected disillusionment with juvenile courts'
treatment of noncriminal youths. See, e.g., DAVID P. FARRINGTON ET AL.,
UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING CRIME: TOWARD A NEW RESEARCH
STRATEGY 127-29 (1986) ("[]t no longer appeared justifiable to include status
offenders in the same process as those whose delinquent acts were also crimes
for adults"); LaMar T. Empey, Juvenile Justice Reforms: Diversion, Due Proc-
ess, and Deinstitutionalization, in PRISONERS IN AMERICA 13 (Lloyd E. Ohlin
ed., 1973); Frank Hellum, Juvenile Justice: The Second Revolution, 25 CRIME
& DELINQ. 299, 300-05 (1979). Congress passed the Federal Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention (JJDP) Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-67 (1994), in 1974
that required states, as a condition of receiving federal formula grants, to ini-
tiate a process to remove noncriminal offenders from secure detention and cor-
rectional facilities and to submit a plan designed to ensure that "within three
years... juveniles who are charged with or who have committed offenses that
would not be criminal if committed by an adult... shall not be placed in se-
cure detention facilities or secure correctional facilities." 42 U.S.C.
§ 5633(a)(12)(A) (1994). Legal restrictions on the co-mingling of status with
delinquent offenders in secure detention and correctional facilities provided
the impetus to divert some status offenders from juvenile courts and to decar-
cerate those who remained in the system. See, e.g., Michael Sosin, Deinstitu-
tionalization of Status Offenders and Dependent and Neglected Youth in Wis-
consin, in NEITHER ANGELS NOR THIEVES, supra note 78, at 513, 515-18.
Ironically, although reformers intended diversion to enhance youths'
autonomy and to reduce state intervention, instead the innovation provided a
mechanism to extend informal supervision further into the normal adolescent
population and to widen the nets of social control. See generally Malcolm W.
Klein, Deinstitutionalization and Diversion of Juvenile Offenders: A Litany of
Impediments, 1 CRIME & JUST. 145 (1979) (discussing the "net-widening" im-
pact of diversion reforms); Kenneth Polk, Juvenile Diversion: A Look at the Re-
cord, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 648 (1984). Diversion provided a rationale to shift
discretion from the core of the juvenile justice process to its periphery. In his
comprehensive study of the history of regulating "stubborn children," Sutton
concludes that diversion 'sanctified and encouraged a strategy for circum-
venting due process, assured that programs would stay in the discretionary
hands of local officials, and encouraged the privatization of long-term social
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duced access to secure public facilities for noncriminal offend-
ers and provided the impetus to transfer many white, female
and middle-class youths whom juvenile courts formerly han-
dled as status offenders into the private sector system of men-
tal health and chemical dependency treatment and confine-
ment.80 Historically, the child welfare, mental health, and
juvenile justice systems dealt with relatively interchangeable
youths whom staff could shift from one agency to another de-
pending upon social attitudes, available funds, and imprecise
legal definitions. Currently, the private sector mental health
and chemical dependency industries serve as institutional suc-
cessors to the juvenile justice system for the care and control of
problematic youths. Whether states or parents incarcerate ju-
veniles in public or private institutions for their "best inter-
ests," for "adjustment reactions" symptomatic of adolescence, or
for "chemical dependency," they rely upon the imagery of diag-
nosis and treatment on a discretionary basis without regard to
formal procedures.
B. WAIVER OF SERIOUS OFFENDERS
At the "hard" end, as a result of recent statutory amend-
ments to "get tough" on crime, judges, prosecutors, and legisla-
tors transfer increasing numbers of younger offenders to crimi-
nal courts for prosecution as adults. The rate of judicial waiver
increased 68% between 1988 and 1992.81 By some estimates,
prosecutors in Florida alone transfer more juveniles to criminal
control." SUTTON, supra note 10, at 215.
80. The JJDP mandate to deinstitutionalize status offenders made it more
difficult to confine noncriminal youths in traditional delinquency institutions.
See supra note 79. As a result, courts may divert or refer and parents "volun-
tarily" may commit many troublesome youths to psychiatric and chemical de-
pendency, facilities in the private sector with fewer procedural safeguards
available than to youths charged with delinquency. See Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 584, 620 (1979). These private treatment facilities comprise a parallel,
"hidden system" of social control for youths, and a growth industry for service
providers. See Lois A. Weithorn, Mental Hospitalization of Troublesome
Youth: An Analysis of Skyrocketing Admission Rates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 773,
808-13 (1988). Many troublesome youths-especially females and children of
middle-class families with mental health or chemical dependency medical in-
surance benefits-whom juvenile courts previously dealt with as status of-
fenders now enter private mental health or substance abuse treatment facili-
ties, which can provide levels of security comparable to those in public
institutions. See IRA M. SCHWARTZ, (IN)JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES 136-39
(1989); see also Weithorn, supra, at 814-20.
81. See HOWARD SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: A NATIONAL REPORT 154 (1995).
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court than do all of the juvenile court judges in the country to-
gether.8 2 In an effort to "crack down" on youth crime, legisla-
tors exclude various combinations of age and offenses from ju-
venile courts' jurisdiction, and then further expand the lists of
excluded offenses and reduce the age of criminal responsibil-
ity.8 3 The pace of legal changes to prosecute more juveniles as
adults escalated sharply in the early 1990s. 84 Cumulatively,
these changes reflect fundamental sentencing policy shifts-
from rehabilitation to retribution, from an emphasis on the of-
fender to the seriousness of the offense, from a focus on a
youth's "amenability to treatment" to public safety, and a
transfer of discretion from the judicial to the legislative or ex-
ecutive branches. These changes in youth crime policy and
practice responded to more fundamental social structural
changes.
The "get tough" juvenile justice policies of the early-1990s
reflect the influences of macro-structural, economic, and racial
demographic changes that occurred in cities during the 1970s
and 1980s, the emergence of the urban black underclass, and
the epidemic of "crack" cocaine and the associated escalation in
gun violence and youth homicides. 85 Between World War II
and the early-1970s, semi-skilled high school graduates could
get good-paying union jobs in the automobile, steel, construc-
tion, and manufacturing industries. Beginning in the 1970s,
the transition from an industrial to an information and service
economy reduced employment opportunities in the manufac-
turing sectors, and produced a bifurcation of economic opportu-
nities based on skills and education.8 6 Between 1969 and 1984,
82. Compare id. at (noting that juvenile court judges nationally trans-
ferred about 11,700 juveniles) and U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, JUVENILE
JUSTICE: JUVENILES PROCESSED IN CRIMINAL COURT AND CASE DISPOSITIONS
10 (1995) (same) with Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Transfer of Ju-
veniles to Criminal Court: A Case Study and Analysis of Prosecutorial Waiver,
5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 281, 288 (1991) (noting annual rise
in number of prosecutorial waivers).
83. PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE RESPONSES TO
SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME: RESEARCH REPORT 3-9 (1996).
84. See generally id.; Feld, supra note 2.
85. See FELD, supra note 5, at 106-07; Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence,
Guns, and the Illicit-Drug Industry, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 10, 26-29
(1995); see also MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 38, at 174.
86. The post-industrial transition from a manufacturing to a service and
information economy adversely affected the ability of semi-skilled high school
graduates economically to sustain "the American Dream." See KATZ, supra
note 49, at 128-29. The emphasis on knowledge and information produced a
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full time employment in manufacturing decreased from 26% to
19%, while employment in the service sectors-for example, fi-
nance, insurance, real estate-increased from 13% to 28% and
surpassed manufacturing employment.87 During the post-
World War II period, public policies and private institutional
arrangements contributed to the growth of predominantly
white suburbs surrounding increasingly poor and minority ur-
ban cores. 88 The migration of whites to the suburbs, the growth
widening earnings gap between high school and college graduates as the bet-
ter-educated got richer and the less well-educated got poorer. See id. at 129-
31. In less than 20 years, as a result of structural economic changes, the gap
between high school and college graduates' earnings widened both because the
educated earn more and the uneducated earn less. See WILLIAM JULIUS
WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 25-
34 (1996). As recently as 1975, college graduates earned only about 25% more
than did high school graduates. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, LOSING
GENERATIONS: ADOLESCENTS IN HIGH-RISK SETTINGS 26 (1993) (noting differ-
ences by race, gender, and education level). Two decades later, the average
earning difference was almost 100%, both because college graduates' earning
capacity increased and'high school graduates' real earning capacity decreased
about 25%. See CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE,
POVERTY, AND THE UNDERCLASS 126 (1992); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
supra, at 25.
87. See KATZ, supra note 49, at 128.
88. Black migration from the rural South to the urban North in the 1920s
and 1930s began to transform the larger older cities. See MASSEY & DENTON,
supra note 38, at 21; see also id. at 19-59. Black Americans became increas-
ingly urban, and whites simultaneously began to move from cities to the sub-
urbs. Between the end of World War II and 1960, about one-third of all Afri-
can-Americans who remained in the South migrated to other parts of the
country and the majority of all blacks lived in central cities. See id. at 18. In
the 1950s and 1960s, urban renewal and highway construction disrupted and
destroyed many urban black communities. See supra notes 49-52 and accom-
panying text.
Massey and Denton argue that public policies and private institutional
arrangements-federal highway, mortgage, and housing policies, real estate
sales practices, bank mortgage loan practices, and insurance industry deci-
sions-created and sustain racial segregation, amplify and exacerbate the
harmful consequences of concentrated poverty, and adversely affect the eco-
nomic and social welfare of black Americans. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra
note 38, at 8. They argue:
residential segregation has been instrumental in creating a structural
niche within which a deleterious set of attitudes and behaviors-a
culture of segregation-has arisen and flourished. Segregation cre-
ated the structural conditions for the emergence of an oppositional
culture that devalues work, schooling, and marriage and that stresses
attitudes and behaviors that are antithetical and often hostile to suc-
cess in the larger economy... Residential segregation is the institu-
tional apparatus that supports other racially discriminatory processes
and binds them together into a coherent and uniquely effective sys-
tem of racial subordination.
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of information, service, and technology jobs in the suburbs, the
bifurcation of the economy based on education, and the dein-
dustrialization of the urban core increased racial segregation
and the concentration of poverty among blacks in the major
cities.89
Id. at 8. Similarly, Robert J. Sampson and Janet L. Lauritsen attribute the
negative effects of concentrated poverty to deliberate public policies to "con-
tain" and isolate minorities.
Opposition from organized community groups to the building of public
housing in "their" neighborhoods, de facto federal policy to tolerate
extensive segregation against blacks in urban housing markets, and
the decision by local governments to neglect the rehabilitation of ex-
isting residential units... have led to massive, segregated housing
projects which have become ghettos for minorities and the disadvan-
taged. The cumulative result is that even given the same objective
socioeconomic status, blacks and whites face vastly different envi-
ronments in which to live, work, and raise their children.
Robert J. Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in
Crime and Criminal Justice in the United States, 21 CRIME & JUST. 311, 338
(1997). Thus, racial segregation, cultural isolation, and concentration of pov-
erty constitute the cumulative community structural consequences of a host of
disparate public policy decisions.
89. Macro-structural economic changes have had a cumulative, deleteri-
ous impact on urban minority residents. See WILSON, supra note 86, at 25-
100. Job losses have occurred primarily in those higher-paying lower-skilled
manufacturing industries to which urban minorities previously had greater
access, and job growth has occurred in the suburbs and in sectors of the econ-
omy that require levels of education beyond that possessed by many urban
minority workers. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED:
THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 100-02 (1987). As a
result of the economic, spatial, and racial reorganization of cities, the past sev-
eral decades have witnessed the emergence of an urban "underclass" living in
concentrated poverty and in racial, social, and cultural isolation. See generally
CHRISTOPHER JENCKS & PAUL E. PETERSON, THE URBAN UNDERCLASS (1991);
WILSON, supra, at 3; Michael B. Katz, The Urban "Underclass" as a Metaphor
of Social Transformation, in THE "UNDERCLASS" DEBATE: VIEWS FROM
HISTORY 3 (Michael B. Katz ed., 1993). Three decades ago, then-Assistant
Secretary of Labor Daniel Patrick Moynihan warned in The Negro Family of
the adverse impact of male unemployment in the urban African-American
community. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR
NATIONAL ACTION (1965), reprinted in THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE
POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY 39-124 (Lee Rainwater & William L. Yancey eds.,
1967). Since Moynihan issued his prophetic warnings, many of those dire pre-
dictions have come to pass: black male unemployment, out-of-wedlock child-
birth, racial isolation, concentrated poverty, and urban violent crime have in-
creased. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 38, at 117-18; WILSON, supra, at
90-92. Wilson attributes the decline of two-parent black families to the struc-
tural transformation of inner cities that reduced young black males' employ-
ment prospects and increased rates of out-of-wedlock childbirth among poor
black women. See WILSON, supra, at 72-84; WILSON, supra note 86, at 87-110.
Since the mid-1960s, the passage of civil rights legislation enabled many
middle-class blacks to take advantage of increased economic opportunities and
[Vol. 84:327
1999] TRANSFORMATION OF JUVENILE COURTS 361
The age-offense-race-specific increase in youth homicide
triggered by the crack epidemic and the proliferation of guns
among youth in the mid-1980s provided the immediate political
catalyst to "get tough" and to "crack down" on youth crime gen-
erally.90 In this context, because of differences in rates of of-
fending by race, "getting tough" on violence meant targeting
young black men. As a result of the connection between race
and youth crime, juveniles have become the symbolic "Willie
Horton" of the 1990s.91
The "Baby Boom" escalation in youth crime that began in
the mid-1960s and peaked in the late-1970s provided an addi-
tional strong political impetus for "get tough" criminal sen-
tencing and waiver policies.92 The politicization of crime poli-
cies and the connection in the public and political minds
between race and youth crime provided a powerful political in-
centive for changes in waiver policies that de-emphasized
youths' "amenability to treatment" and instead focused almost
exclusively on "public safety."93 These statutory changes coin-
cided with escalating youth crime rates and violence in the
late-1970s and again in the late-1980s and early-1990s, and
with public and political perception of youth crime primarily as
an urban black male phenomenon. 94
to leave the ghettoes. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 38, at 7-9. Their
mobility deprived the urban minority communities of the human resources
necessary for social stability and amplified the effects of concentrated poverty
and racial isolation among the "truly disadvantaged" who remained. See
WILSON, supra, at 56-57. Simultaneously, structural changes decreased the
demands for unskilled and semi-skilled labor in the manufacturing sectors
that previously provided black men with little formal education with access to
higher wage jobs. See id. at 39-46. The deindustrialization of the inner urban
core reduced the pool of "marriageable" black men who could support a family.
MARIAN WRIGHT EDELIAN, FAMILIES IN PERIL: AN AGENDA FOR SOCIAL
CHANGE 13-14 (1987). As marriage to unemployed or unemployable black
males became less attractive, unwed child-bearing and female-headed families
proliferated among poor black women. See id. at 14. The decisions by young
black women not to marry the fathers of their children account for virtually all
the increase in the number of children in female-headed households and in
poverty. See id. at 10-16.
90. See ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 3-16; Blumstein, supra note 85, at 13-
20; see also Alfred Blumstein & Daniel Cork, Linking Gun Availability to
Youth Gun Violence, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 6-12 (1996); Philip J.
Cook & John H. Laub, The Unprecedented Epidemic in Youth Violence, 24
CRIME & JUST. 27, 51-58 (1998); infra note 107.
91. Cf BECKETT, supra note 56, at 58, 84-85.
92. See ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 3-4.
93. See BECKErT, supra note 56, at 58, 84-85.
94. See id. at 31-43; see also FELD, supra note 5, at 197-202.
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The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Index Crime rates,
juvenile crime rates, and violent juvenile crime rates followed
roughly similar patterns-increasing from the mid-1960s until
1980, declining during the mid-1980s, and then rebounding to
another peak in the early-1990s, since which time they have
declined again.95 Between 1965 and 1980, the overall juvenile
Index Violent Crime and homicide rates doubled, followed by a
second, sharp upsurge between 1986 and 1994.96 The rapid es-
calation in juvenile violence in the late-1970s, and especially in
the late-1980s, the arrests of increasingly younger juveniles for
violence, and the dramatic rise in homicide arrests provide the
backdrop for public and political concerns about youth crime
and subsequent legal changes.97
Two aspects of youth crime and violence have special rele-
vance for understanding the legislative changes in juvenile
court waiver and sentencing policies during this period. Differ-
ences in arrest rates for violent crimes committed by juveniles
of difference races and the unique role of guns in the dramatic
surge in homicides since the late-1980s account for most of the
changes in patterns of youth crime and violence in the past
decades. As Figure 3 indicates, since the mid-1960s, police
have arrested black juveniles under eighteen years of age for
all violent offenses-murder, rape, robbery, and assault-at a
rate about five times greater than that of white youths, 98 and
for homicide at a rate more than seven times greater than that
of white youths. 99 Beginning in 1986, when the youth homicide
rates began to escalate sharply again, the arrest rates of black
and white juveniles diverged abruptly. Between 1986 and
1993, arrests of white juveniles for homicide increased about
40%, while those of black youths jumped by 278%. I°°
95. See FELD, supra note 5, at 197-202.
96. See id.
97. See TORBET ET AL., supra note 83, at 59-61; Blumstein, supra note 85,
at 32-36; Feld, supra note 2, at 192-95.
98. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS: 1993, at 447 (Kathleen Ma-
guire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1994).
99. See MELISSA SICKMUND ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE
OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1997 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE 13 (1997).
100. See id.
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Figure 3
Juvenile Arrests for Violent Crimes
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Source: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS: 1993, at 447 (Kathleen Ma-
guire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1994).
Figure 4 shows the actual numbers, rather than the rates,
of juveniles arrested for homicide by race. For example, in
1995, the FBI estimated that 21,600 people were murdered;
law enforcement agencies "cleared" about two-thirds (62%) of
those cases with arrests of one or more offenders.'10 Police
identified a juvenile as an offender in about 14% (1,900) of all
homicides and implicated about 2,300 juveniles for those
deaths. 0 2 And, in 1995, police arrested black juveniles for
more than half of those murders. 10 3 As Figure 4 illustrates,
during the early to mid-1980s, police arrested roughly equal
numbers of black and white juveniles for homicide. Beginning
in 1986, when the youth homicide rates began to escalate, ar-
rests of black and white juveniles also began to diverge sharply.
Although frightening, these changes reveal the "tyranny of
small numbers." When dealing with a rare event, like homi-
101. See id. at 12.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 13.
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cide, even small increases in the absolute number of cases yield
much larger percentage changes. Despite the popular imagery
of youthful murderers, police arrested chronological juveniles
only for one homicide in seven. But these small numbers pro-
duced substantial percentage increases in homicide rates and
provoked strong legislative reactions. 104
Figure 4
Juvenile Homicide Offenders
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Source: MELISSA SICKMUND ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE
OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1997 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE 13 (1997).
Finally, Figure 5 identifies the role of guns as the proxi-
mate cause of the sharp escalation of youth homicide that be-
gan in the mid-1980s. Figure 5 reflects the number of juvenile
offenders implicated in homicides over the sixteen-year time
span and the cause of their victims' deaths. The number of
homicide deaths that juveniles caused by means other than
firearms averaged about 570 per year and fluctuated within a
"normal range" of about ten percent. In short, juveniles con-
tinued to kill people with knives, blunt objects, and hands and
feet just as they always did. By contrast, between 1984 and
1994, the number of deaths caused by firearms increased 412%.
104. See supra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
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Thus, in the span of a decade, arrests of adolescents for killing
nearly tripled and the availability and use of firearms by juve-
niles account for almost the entire increase in youth homi-
cide.105 Because of the relative stability of the number of non-
gun homicides, virtually all of the variance in homicides re-
flects changes in the gun component of murders. Thus, "fluc-
tuations in the proportion of youth homicide committed with
guns might explain eighty percent of the variation in total
homicide rates."0 6 Because of the disproportionate involve-
ment of black youths in violence and homicide, both as perpe-
trators and as victims, almost all of these "excess homicides"
involving guns occurred within the urban young black male
population. 0 7 The intersections of race, guns, and homicide
105. See FELD, supra note 5, at 207-08; ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 89-106;
FRANKLIN ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM:
LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 106-23 (1997); Franklin Zimring, Kids, Guns,
and Homicide: Policy Notes on an Age-Specific Epidemic, 59 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 25, 29 (1996) [hereinafter Zimring, Kids, Guns].
106. Zimring, Kids, Guns, supra note 105, at 29.
107. See ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 17-30; see also Blumstein, supra note
85, at 16-22; Blumstein & Cork, supra note 90, at 15-16.
Alfred Blumstein, supra note 85, at 29-32, analyzed these changing pat-
terns of age- and race-specific homicide rates and attributed the dramatic in-
crease in youth homicides to the crack cocaine drug industry that emerged in
large cities during the mid- to late-1980s. The low price and addictive proper-
ties of "crack" increased the numbers of buyers and weekly transactions, and
thereby increased the number of sellers to accommodate the demand. See id.
at 29-30. Drug distribution attracted youths because juveniles faced lower
risks of severe penalties than do adults, and especially induced young urban,
African-American males who lacked alternative economic opportunities. See
Blumstein & Cork, supra note 90, at 9-10. Youths in the drug industry take
more risks than would adults and arm themselves for self-protection and to
resolve disputes. The ready availability of guns abets the prevalence of lethal
violence because those involved in illegal markets cannot resolve their dis-
putes through formal mechanisms. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE 256-60 (Albert J. Reiss & Jef-
frey A. Roth eds., 1993). Although guns constitute a "tool of the trade" in the
drug industry, their proliferation and diffusion within the wider youth popula-
tion for self-defense and status also has contributed to the escalation of homi-
cides. See Blumstein & Cork, supra note 90, at 11-12. As more young men
become increasingly fearful of each other and arm themselves defensively,
both the killings and the fear expands. See Cook & Laub, supra note 90, at 58.
The increased use of guns to commit murders accounted for virtually all of the
increase in the homicide rate for older youths in the past decade. See ZIMRING
& HAWKINS, supra note 105, at 107-10. The lucrative and violent drug indus-
try, in turn, further accelerated the deterioration of urban neighborhoods, has-
tened "the exodus of stable families," undermined the authority of community
leaders, "weakened inhibitions against violence," and provided illicit role mod-
els to attract children and adolescents into crime. NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, supra note 86, at 67-68.
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fanned the public "panic" and political "crack down" that, in
-turn, led to the recent "get tough" reformulation of juvenile
waiver policies.
Figure 5
Juvenile Homicides and Guns
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Source: MELISSA SIOKMUND ET AL., U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE
OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1997 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE 13 (1997).
Within the past decade, the prevalence of guns in the
hands of children, the apparent randomness of gang violence
and drive-by shootings, the disproportional racial minority in-
volvement in homicides, and media depictions of callous youths'
gratuitous violence have inflamed public fear. Politicians have
promoted and exploited those fears for electoral advantage, de-
cried a coming generation of "super-predators" suffering from
"moral poverty," and demonized young people to muster sup-
port for policies to transfer youths to criminal court and to in-
carcerate them. 08 Some analysts predict a demographic "time
bomb" of youth violence in the near future to which minority
juveniles are expected to contribute disproportionately. 10 9
Thus, the increase in gun homicide by young black males in the
108. FELD, supra note 5, at 208.
109. See FOX, supra note 1, at 3, 15; ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 60-65.
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late-1980s provided a much broader political impetus to crack
down on all young offenders in general and violent minority of-
fenders in particular.
The widespread crack down on youth crime in the early-
1990s culminates the politicization of crime and juvenile justice
policies that actually began several decades earlier. In the
1960s, the Civil Rights Movement created divisions within the
Democratic Party between racial and social policy liberals and
conservatives, Northerners and Southerners. 10 Republican
politicians seized crime control, affirmative action, and public
welfare as racially-tinged "wedge issues" with which to distin-
guish themselves from Democrats in order to woo southern
white voters; crime policies for the first time became a central
issue in partisan politics.' Beginning in the 1960s, conserva-
tive Republicans advocated "law and order," supported a "war
on crime," and favored repression over rehabilitation in re-
sponse to rising "baby boom" crime rates, civil rights marches,
students' protests against the war in Vietnam, and urban and
campus turmoil." 2 As a result of "sound-bite" politics, symbols
and rhetoric have shaped penal policies more than knowledge,
social science research, or substance."13 "Since the 1960s, poli-
ticians' fear of being labeled 'soft-on-crime' has led to a constant
ratcheting-up of punitiveness." 1 4 Efforts to "get tough" have
supported a succession of "wars" on crime and, later on drugs,
longer criminal sentences, increased prison populations, and
disproportional incarceration of racial minority offenders."15 As
a result of demagogic appeals, no candidate dares to run on a
platform that her opponent can characterize as "soft on crime";
politicians avoid thoughtful discussions of complex crime policy
issues in an era of 30-second commercials." 6 The mass media
depict and the public perceive the "crime problem" and juvenile
courts' clientele primarily as poor, urban black males."17 Politi-
cians manipulate and exploit these racially-tinged perceptions
for political advantage with demagogic pledges to "get tough"
110. See BECKETT, supra note 56, at 40-43.
111. See id. at 30-43.
112. See BECKErr, supra note 56, at 25; FELD, supra note 5, at 90.
113. See FELD, supra note 5, at 90.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 89-90; TONRY, supra note 62, at 94-95.
116. See BECKETT, supra note 56, at 83-88.
117. See id. at 62-78.
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and "crack down" on youth crime, which has become a "code
word" for young black males. 118
Coinciding with the escalation of youth crime in the late-
1970s and again in the late-1980s, waiver policies underwent a
jurisprudential change from rehabilitation to retribution. 119
The overarching themes of these legislative amendments in-
clude a shift from individualized justice to just deserts, and
from offender to offense. 120 The changes in waiver policy reflect
a fundamental cultural and legal reconceptualization of youth
from innocent and dependent children to responsible and
autonomous adult-like offenders. 121 Politicians' sound bites-
"adult crime, adult time" or "old enough to do the crime, old
enough to do the time"-exemplify the reformulation of adoles-
cence and represent crime policies that provide no formal rec-
ognition of youthfulness as a mitigating factor in sentencing. 122
State legislatures use offense criteria in waiver laws either as
dispositional guidelines to structure and limit judicial discre-
tion, to guide prosecutorial charging decisions, or automatically
to exclude certain youths from juvenile court jurisdiction. 123
Once youths make the transition to the adult system, criminal
court judges sentence them as if they are adults, impose the
same sentences, send them to the same prisons, and even exe-
cute them for the crimes they committed as children. 124
State legislators adopt social control policies within a bi-
nary framework-either child or adult, either treatment or
punishment, either juvenile court or criminal court. Unfortu-
nately, jurisdictional bifurcation frustrates effective and ra-
tional social control and often results in a "punishment gap"
when youths make the transition between the two systems.
While violent young offenders receive dramatically more severe
sentences as adults than they would have received as delin-
quents, chronic property offenders, who constitute the bulk of
youths whom juvenile court judges transfer to criminal court,
118. See id.
119. See TORBETETAL., supra note 83, at 60.
120. See id.; see also Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 4, at 75-81.
121. See Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 4, at 79.
122. See id. at 80.
123. See TORBET ET AL., supra note 83, at 59-61; Feld, Juvenile Waiver
Statutes, supra note 4, at 503-19; Feld, supra note 73, at 1024-34.
124. See Feld, supra note 2, at 212-29; see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361 (1989).
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actually receive shorter sentences as adults than judges would
have imposed had they remained within the juvenile system. 25
Many of the recent changes in waiver laws represent an ef-
fort to improve the fit between juvenile waiver criteria and
criminal court sentencing practices, to use juvenile prior rec-
ords more extensively to enhance the sentences of young adult
offenders, and systematically to respond to career offenders and
career criminality that begins in early adolescence but contin-
ues into adulthood. 126 Efforts to integrate juvenile and criminal
court sentencing practices represent an effort to rationalize so-
cial control of serious and chronic offenders on both sides of the
juvenile and criminal court line. Recently enacted intermediate
sentencing options like extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecu-
tions and "blended" juvenile-criminal sentences provide exam-
ples of states groping toward graduated, escalating sanctions
for young offenders across the adolescent and criminal career
developmental continuum. 127 The amount and scope of legisla-
tive activity and the rapidity of these changes cannot be over-
emphasized. Since 1992, forty-seven of the fifty states and the
District of Columbia have amended provisions of their juvenile
codes, sentencing statutes, and transfer laws to target youths
who commit serious or violent crimes.1 28 Is it simply coinciden-
tal that this tidal wave of law reforms corresponds with the rise
of youth homicide and disproportionately affects young black
men?
C. PUNISHING ORDINARY DELINQUENTS
Finally, the "criminological triage" process has resulted in
increased punishment of those ordinary delinquents who re-
main within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 29 The juris-
125. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 2, at 202-05; Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz
& Barry C. Feld, The End of the Line: An Empirical Study of Judicial Waiver,
86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 449, 485-89 (1996); Marcy Rasmussen Pod-
kopacz & Barry C. Feld, Judicial Waiver Policy and Practice: Persistence, Seri-
ousness and Race, 14 LAW & INEQ. J. 73, 156-65 (1995).
126. See Feld, supra note 2, at 205-15.
127. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260.126 (1998), amended by Juvenile Court
Act, ch. 139, § 12, 1999 Minn. Laws § 260B.130; TORBET ETAL., supra note 83,
at 11-14; Feld, supra note 2, at 239-43; Feld, supra note 73, at 1038-51.
128. See TORBET ET AL., supra note 83, at 59-61; U.S. GENERAL AccOUNT-
ING OFFICE, supra note 82, at 1, 19-20.
129. See generally Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 4 (analyzing
changes in juvenile justice sentencing laws and practices); Feld, supra note 2,
at 220-39; Julianne P. Sheffer, Serious and Habitual Juvenile Offender Stat-
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prudential shifts from offender to offense and from treatment to
punishment that inspired changes in waiver policies increas-
ingly affect the sentences that juvenile court judges impose on
delinquent offenders as well. Progressive reformers envisioned
a broader and more encompassing social welfare system for
youths and did not circumscribe state power narrowly. 130 Ju-
venile courts' parens patriae ideology combined social welfare
with penal social control in one institution, minimized proce-
dural safeguards, and maximized discretion to provide flexibil-
ity in diagnosis and treatment.'3 ' Progressive reformers fo-
cused primary attention on youths' social circumstances and
accorded secondary significance either to procedural safeguards
or to proof of guilt or the specific offense. 132 More recently,
however, the public impetus and political pressures to waive
the most serious young offenders to criminal courts also impel
juvenile court judges to "get tough" and punish more severely
the remaining criminal delinquents.
The assumed differences between juvenile treatment and
criminal punishment provided the rationale for the Supreme
Court in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania to deny jury trials in delin-
quency proceedings and, more fundamentally, for states to
maintain a juvenile justice system separate from the adult
one. 133 As states' juvenile sentencing laws and policies in-
creasingly "get tough," however, the always tenuous distinc-
tions between treatment and punishment blur even further.
Despite the fundamental importance of the distinctions be-
tween rehabilitation and punishment, the McKeiver Court did
not analyze the nature of those differences.
Several indicators reveal whether a juvenile court judge's
disposition punishes a youth for his past offense or treats him
for his future welfare. Legislative preambles and court opin-
ions explicitly endorse punishment as an appropriate compo-
nent ofjuvenile sanctions. 134 States' juvenile codes increasingly
employ the rhetoric of accountability, responsibility, punish-
utes: Reconciling Punishment and Rehabilitation Within the Juvenile Justice
System, 48 VAND. L. REV. 479 (1995).
130. See supra notes 16-33 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
133. 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971).
134. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.01(1)(b) (West Supp. 1999) (noting
that "[t]o ensure the protection of society," a child should be given "the most
appropriate control, discipline, punishment, and treatment.., consistent with
the seriousness of the act committed").
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ment, and public safety rather than a child's welfare or "best
interests."135 States' juvenile sentencing laws increasingly em-
phasize individual responsibility and justice system account-
ability, and provide for determinate or mandatory minimum
sentences keyed to the seriousness of the offense. 136 Currently,
about half (22) of the states use some type of "just deserts" de-
terminate or mandatory minimum offense-based criteria to
guide judicial sentencing discretion. 137  Some states have
adopted sentencing guidelines to impose presumptive, determi-
nate and proportional sentences on delinquents based on a ju-
venile's age, seriousness of the offense, and prior record. 138
Other states impose mandatory minimum sentences based on
age and offenses that prescribe minimum terms of confinement
or youths' level of security placement. 139 "Since 1992, 15 States
and the District of Columbia have added or modified statutes
that provide for a mandatory minimum period of incarceration
of juveniles committing certain violent or other serious
crimes." 140 Similarly, many states' departments of corrections
administratively have adopted security classification and re-
lease guidelines that use offense criteria to specify proportional
or mandatory minimum terms of institutional confinement. 141
All of these de jure sentencing provisions-determinate and
mandatory minimum laws, and correctional and parole release
guidelines-share the common feature of offense-based disposi-
tions that explicitly link the length of time delinquents serve to
135. See Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 4, at 842-47; see also
Martin Gardner, Punishment and Juvenile Justice: A Conceptual Framework
for Assessing Constitutional Rights of Youthful Offenders, 35 VAND. L. REV.
791, 793-95 (1982); Linda Giardino, Statutory Rhetoric: The Reality Behind
Juvenile Justice Policies in America, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 223, 228-46 (1997) (argu-
ing that despite the punitive trend, states should be able to create an effective
juvenile justice system).
136. See TORBET ET AL., supra note 83, at 14-15; Feld, supra note 2, at 224-
28.
137. See TORBET ETAL., supra note 83, at 14-15; Sheffer, supra note 129, at
500-06.
138. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010(2)(d) (West 1999); Feld,
Punishment, Treatment, supra note 4, at 850-79; Feld, supra note 73, at 1083-
94.
139. See TORBET ET AL., supra note 83, at 14-15; Sheffer, supra note 129, at
489-92.
140. TORBET ET AL., supra note 83, at 14.
141. See SUSAN GUARINo-GHEZZI & EDWARD J. LOUGHRAN, BALANCING
JUVENILE JUSTICE 139-43 (1996); Martin L. Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist,
Cracking Down on Juveniles: The Changing Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 323, 345-50 (1991).
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the seriousness of the crime they committed rather than to
their "real needs." These statutory provisions use principles of
proportionality and determinacy to rationalize sentencing deci-
sions, to increase the penal bite of juvenile sanctions, and to
allow legislators symbolically to demonstrate their toughness.
Empirical evaluations of juvenile court judges' sentencing
practices consistently report two general findings. First, the
"principle of the offense"--present offense and prior record-ac-
counts for most of the variance in juvenile court sentences that
can be explained1 42 Every methodologically rigorous study of
juvenile court sentencing practices reports that judges focus
primarily on the seriousness of the present offense and prior
record when they sentence delinquents. 43 Practical adminis-
trative and bureaucratic considerations impel judges to give
primacy to offense factors when they sentence delinquents.' 44
Organizational desire to avoid unfavorable media attention and
political scrutiny--"fear of scandal"--constrains judges to im-
pose more restrictive sentences on more serious offenders. 145
142. See Feld, supra note 2, at 222-32.
143. See generally Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Race Effects in
Juvenile Justice Decision-Making: Findings of a Statewide Analysis, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 392 (1996) (analyzing effects of race in juvenile jus-
tice); Jeffrey Fagan et al., Blind Justice? The Impact of Race on the Juvenile
Justice Process, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 224 (1987) (same); Belinda R. McCarthy
& Brent L. Smith, The Conceptualization of Discrimination in the Juvenile
Justice Process: The Impact of Administrative Factors and Screening Decisions
on Juvenile Court Dispositions, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 41 (1986) (analyzing the im-
pact of race, sex, and social class on juvenile court dispositions).
144. See MATZA, supra note 21, at 120-25.
145. See ROBERT EMERSON, JUDGING DELINQUENTS: CONTEXT AND
PROCESS IN JUVENILE COURT 36-37 (1969); MATZA, supra note 21, at 120-25.
See generally AARON CICOUREL, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE (1968). One ethnographic study observed that:
juvenile court decision-making comes to be pervaded by a sense of
vulnerability to adverse public reaction for failing to control or re-
strain delinquent offenders.... [Fear of scrutiny and criticism in-
creases pressures] to impose maximum restraints on the offender-in
most instances, incarceration. Anything less risks immediate criti-
cism. But more than this, it also exposes the court to the possibility
of even stronger reaction in the future. For given any recurrence of
serious illegal activity, former decisions that can be interpreted as
"lenient" become difficult to defend.
Robert M. Emerson, Role Determinants in Juvenile Court, in HANDBOOK OF
CRIMINOLOGY 621, 624 (Daniel Glaser ed., 1974).
Other court analysts emphasize that the juvenile court judge is ultimately
responsible and responsive to the public:
He will have to explain... why the 17-year-old murderer of an inno-
cent matron was allowed to roam the streets, on probation, when just
1999] TRANSFORMATION OF JUVENILE COURTS 373
Moreover, complex organizations that pursue multiple goals
develop bureaucratic strategies to simplify individualized as-
sessments; the present offense and prior record provide a rou-
tine basis to rationalize decisions. 146
Secondly, after controlling for legal and offense variables,
the individualized justice of juvenile courts produces racial dis-
parities in the sentencing of minority offenders. 147 In 1988,
last year he was booked for mugging.... Somehow, an invoking of the
principle of individualized justice and a justification of mercy on the
basis of accredited social-work theory hardly seems appropriate on
these occasions.
MATZA, supra note 21, at 122. By sentencing serious juvenile offenders more
formally and restrictively, judges can deflect unfavorable retrospective scru-
tiny and political criticism. Offense criteria provide juvenile court judges with
an efficient organizational tool with which to classify the "risks" that youths
pose to the public and, by way of "scandal," to the court. Because juvenile
courts routinely collect information about present offense and prior records,
these factors provide a simple rule-of-thumb by which to make, defend and le-
gitimate sentencing decisions. One study reported that, despite claims of in-
dividualization, juvenile court judges appeared to base their sentencing deci-
sions primarily on youths' present offense and prior record:
[C]omparisons ofjuvenile and adult sentencing practices suggest that
juvenile and criminal courts in California are much more alike than
statutory language would suggest, in the degree to which they focus
on aggravating circumstances of the charged offense and the defen-
dant's prior record in determining the degree of confinement that will
be imposed.
PETER GREENWOOD ET AL., YOUTH CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE IN
CALIFORNIA 51 (1983).
146. See generally CICOUREL, supra note 145.
147. The second consistent finding from juvenile court sentencing research
is that, after controlling for the present offense and prior record, individual-
ized sentencing discretion is often synonymous with racial discrimination. See
KIMBERLY KEMPF-LEONARD ET AL., MINORITIES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE 73
(1995); CARL POPE & WILLIAM FEYERHERM, MINORITIES IN THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEM 2-3 (1992); Barry Krisberg et al., The Incarceration of Minor-
ity Youth, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 173, 185 (1987). But see McCarthy & Smith,
supra note 143, at 49 (noting "[m]ost studies have concluded race is not a sig-
nificant factor"). A review of earlier juvenile court sentencing studies found
"clear and consistent evidence of a racial differential operating at each deci-
sion level. Moreover, the differentials operate continuously over various deci-
sion levels to produce a substantial accumulative racial differential which
transforms a more or less heterogeneous racial arrest population into a homo-
geneous institutionalized black population." Allen E. Liska & Mark Tausig,
Theoretical Interpretations of Social Class and Racial Differentials in Legal
Decision-Making for Juveniles, 20 SOC. Q. 197, 205 (1979). A review of juve-
nile justice sentencing research two decades later reached the same conclu-
sion:
[Ilt is in the juvenile justice system that race discrimination appears
most widespread-minorities (and youth in predominantly minority
jurisdictions) are more likely to be detained and receive out-of-home
placements than whites regardless of "legal" considerations. Because
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Congress amended the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Pre-
vention (JJDP) Act to require states receiving federal funds to
assure equitable treatment on the basis, inter alia, of race, and
to assess the sources of minority over-representation in juvenile
detention facilities and institutions. 148 In response to this
JJDP Act mandate, a number of states examined and found ra-
cial disparities in their juvenile justice systems.149 A review of
these evaluation studies reported that, after controlling for of-
fense variables, minority youths were over-represented in se-
cure detention facilities in forty-one of forty-two states and in
all thirteen of thirteen states that analyzed other phases of ju-
venile justice decision-making and institutional confinement. 150
Most studies find evidence of discrimination against mi-
nority youths and report that cumulative decisions by court
personnel amplify these racial disparities as youths moved
processing in the juvenile justice system is deeply implicated in the
construction of a criminal (or "prior") record, experiences as a juvenile
serve as a major predictor of future processing.
Sampson & Lauritsen, supra note 88, at 363.
148. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(16) (1994) (requiring states receiving federal funds
to ensure equitable treatment on the basis inter alia of race).
149. Discretionary decisions at various stages of the justice process amplify
racial disparities as minority youths proceed through the system and result in
more severe dispositions than for comparable white youths. See BARRY
KRISBERG & JAMES AUSTIN, REINVENTING JUVENILE JUSTICE 116-34 (1993);
McCarthy & Smith, supra note 143, at 58. The research emphasizes the im-
portance of analyzing juvenile justice decision-making as a multi-stage process
rather than focusing solely on the final dispositional decision. For example,
dramatic increases in referral rates of minority youths to juvenile courts in
seventeen states resulted in corresponding increases in detention and institu-
tional placement. See Edmund F. McGarrell, Trends in Racial Disproportion-
ality in Juvenile Court Processing: 1985-1989, 39 CRIME & DELINQ. 29, 46
(1993). Juvenile courts detain black youths at higher rates than they do white
youths charged with similar offenses, and detained youths typically receive
more severe sentences. See KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra, at 125-28; M.A. Bort-
ner & Wornie L. Reed, The Preeminence of Process: An Example of Refocused
Justice Research, 66 SOC. SCI. Q. 413, 421 (1985); Charles E. Frazier & J.K.
Cochran, Detention of Juveniles: Its Effects on Subsequent Juvenile Court
Processing Decisions, 17 YOUTH & SOC'Y 286, 293 (1986). Most recent studies
confirm that minority youths receive more severe dispositions than do white
youths even after controlling for relevant legal variables. See, e.g., KRISBERG
& AUSTIN, supra, at 125-28. While offense criteria affect initial screening, de-
tention, and charging decisions, as cases progress through the adjudicatory
process, youths' race affects their dispositions and minority youths receive
more severe sentences. See, e.g., id. at 118-34; Bishop & Frazier, supra note
143, at 405-06; Fagan et al., supra note 143, at 250-51.
150. See Carl E. Pope, Racial Disparities in Juvenile Justice System,
OVERCROWDED TIMES, Dec. 1994, at 5.
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through the system.' 51 Two-thirds of the studies reviewed
showed either direct or indirect evidence of discrimination.1 52 A
national study of incarceration trends reported incarceration
rates for minority youths three to four times greater than those
of white juveniles. 53 Moreover, judges sentenced most minor-
ity youths to public secure facilities and committed more white
youths to private facilities. By 1991, juvenile courts confined
less than one-third (31%) of non-Hispanic white juveniles in
public long-term facilities; minority youths comprised more
two-thirds (69%) of confined youths. 54 Juvenile courts commit-
ted black juveniles to training schools at a rate nearly five
times higher than that of white youths, and blacks comprised
(49%) of all youths in institutions. 155
The structural context of juvenile justice decision-making
also may redound to the detriment of minority youths. For ex-
ample, urban courts tend to be more formal procedurally and to
sentence all juveniles more severely.' 56 Urban courts also have
greater access to detention facilities, and youths held in pre-
trial detention typically receive more severe sentences than do
those who remain at liberty. 157 Proportionally, more minority
youths live in urban environs, and police disproportionately ar-
rest and detain them for violent and drug crimes. 158 Thus, the
geographic and structural context of juvenile justice admini-
stration, crime patterns, urbanism, "underclass threat," and
race may interact to produce minority over-representation in
detention facilities and correctional institutions.1 59
151. See Carl E. Pope & William H. Feyerherm, Minority Status and Juve-
nile Justice Processing: An Assessment of the Research Literature (Part 1), 22
CRIM. JUST. ABSTRAcTS 327, 333-35 (1990); Carl E. Pope & William H. Feyer-
herm, Minority Status and Juvenile Justice Processing: An Assessment of the
Research Literature (Part 2), 22 CRIM. JUST. ABSTRACTS 527, 528 (1990).
152. See supra notes 143 & 151 and accompanying text.
153. See Krisberg et al., supra note 147, at 84-90.
154. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 81, at 166.
155. See id.
156. See FELD, supra note 76, at 158-202; SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note
81, at 136-37. See generally Barry C. Feld, Justice by Geography: Urban, Sub-
urban, and Rural Variations in Juvenile Justice Administration, 82 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 156 (1991).
157. See FELD, supra note 76, at 198-200; Bishop & Frazier, supra note
143, at 404.
158. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 81, at 101.
159. See generally Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, Structural Varia-
tions in Juvenile Court Processing: Inequality, the Underclass, and Social Con-
trol, 27 L. & SOC'YREV. 285 (1993).
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Amendments to juvenile sentencing statutes associated
with the "crack down" on youth crime have had a substantial
impact on the proportion of minority youths in correctional con-
finement. Figure 6 depicts one-day counts of youths confined in
public detention and correctional facilities. It provides one in-
dicator of the proportional changes in the racial composition of
institutional populations for the 1985-1995 period correspond-
ing with the era of "get tough" legislative changes in sentencing
laws. During the decade, the overall numbers of youths in cus-
tody on any given day increased almost 40%, from 49,322 to
68,983. Despite the overall increase in daily custody popula-
tions, the percentage of white juveniles confined in public facili-
ties actually declined 7%, while the percentage of confined
black juveniles increased almost 63%. Thus, the overall in-
creases and percentage changes reflect the sharp growth in mi-
nority youth in confinement. Because of these changes in the
numerical composition of confined delinquents, the proportion
of white juveniles in custody declined from 44% to 32% of all
youths, while the proportion of blacks increased from 37% to
43% and that of Hispanics increased from 13% to 21% of all
confined youths.
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Figure 6
Juveniles in Custody by Race/Ethnicity
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Source: OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,
CENSUS OF PUBLIC JUVENILE DETENTION, CORRECTIONAL AND SHELTER
FACILITIES 1985-95, at 1 (1996).
Juvenile courts, as extensions of criminal courts, give pri-
macy to offense factors when they sentence youths. To the ex-
tent that parens patriae ideology legitimizes individualization
and differential processing, it also exposes "disadvantaged"
youths to the prospects of more extensive state intervention.
According to juvenile courts' treatment ideology, judges' discre-
tionary decisions should disproportionally affect minority
youths. The Progressives intended judges to focus on youths'
social circumstances rather than simply their offenses, and de-
signed juvenile court policies to discriminate between "our"
children and "other people's children." 160 In a society charac-
terized by great inequality, those most "in need" are also those
most "at risk" for juvenile court intervention. For example, the
ability of parents to provide "outpatient" supervision and com-
munity controls may affect youths' dispositions. 161 The number
160. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
161. In a system of individualized justice, "parental sponsorship" may
qualify or modify traditional criminal sentencing principles. See MATZA, supra
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of parents in a household provides juvenile justice personnel
with a shorthand tool to assess the levels of supervision avail-
able, influences case processing decisions, and adversely affects
black youths who live in single-parent households to an even
greater extent than white delinquents. 16
2
Examining juvenile correctional facilities and evaluating
their effectiveness provides another indicator of the increased
punitiveness of juvenile justice. Evaluations of juvenile correc-
tional facilities in the decades following Gault reveal a con-
tinuing gap between the rhetoric of rehabilitation and the puni-
tive reality.163 Criminological research, judicial opinions, and
note 21, at 124-25. Juvenile court personnel whom researchers questioned
about racial disparities in case processing responded that "delinquent youths
from single-parent families and those from families incapable of (or perceived
to be incapable of) providing good parental supervision are more likely to be
referred to court and placed under state control." Bishop & Frazier, supra
note 143, at 409. They felt that even though black youths' social circum-
stances placed them at a systematic disadvantage because larger proportions
came from single-parent households, courts properly considered these factors
when they screened and sentenced youths. See id. If one subscribes to a utili-
tarian or treatment ideology, then these kinds of variations in youths' personal
backgrounds and their "real needs" should affect case outcomes.
162. See SIMON I. SINGER, RECRIMINALIZING DELINQUENCY: VIOLENT
JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM 78-79 (1996); see also Bishop
& Frazier, supra note 143, at 408.
163. The Supreme Court in Gault noted the disjunctions between rehabili-
tative rhetoric and the punitive reality of delinquency confinement when it
granted juveniles some procedural safeguards:
[Hlowever euphemistic the title, a "receiving home" or an "industrial
school" for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the
child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. His world becomes
"a building with whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institu-
tional hours .... " Instead of mother and father and sisters and
brothers and friends and classmates, his world is peopled by guards,
custodians, state employees, and "delinquents" confined with him for
anything from waywardness to rape and homicide.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967) (footnote omitted) (quoting Holmes'. Appeal,
379 Pa. 599, 616 (1954)).
Since Gault, the titles of some of the criminological and journalistic stud-
ies of juvenile correctional facilities reveal their content: see, for example,
CLEMENS BARTOLLAS ET AL., JUVENILE VICTIMIZATION: THE INSTITUTIONAL
PARADOX 259 (1976) (characterizing Ohio juvenile correctional system as
"anti-therapeutic, anti-rehabilitative, and as exploitative and demeaning of
keepers and kept alike"); BARRY C. FELD, NEUTRALIZING INMATE VIOLENCE:
JUVENILE OFFENDERS IN INSTITUTIONS 160 (1977) (describing violent and pu-
nitive facilities in which staff and other residents abused inmates); STEVEN
LERNER, BODILY HARM: THE PATTERN OF FEAR AND VIOLENCE AT THE
CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTHORITY 12 (1986) (finding that "a young man con-
victed of a crime cannot pay his debt to society safely. The hard truth is that
the CYA staff cannot protect its inmates from being beaten or intimidated by
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investigative studies report staff beatings of inmates, the use of
medications for social control purposes, extensive reliance on
solitary confinement, and a virtual absence of meaningful re-
habilitative programs164 A study sponsored by the Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention of Conditions of
Confinement reported endemic institutional overcrowding. 165
In 1991, almost half of all long-term public institutions oper-
ated above their design capacity, as did more than three-
quarters of the largest facilities, those that housed more than
350 inmates. 66 Despite "rehabilitative rhetoric" and a euphe-
mistic vocabulary, the simple truth is that juvenile court judges
increasingly consign disproportionately minority offenders to
overcrowded custodial warehouses that constitute little more
than youth prisons.
Evaluations of juvenile "treatment" programs provide little
evidence that training schools, the most common form of insti-
tutional treatment for the largest numbers of serious and
chronic delinquents, effectively treat youths or reduce their re-
cidivism rates. 67 Despite these generally negative results,
other prisoners."); KENNETH WOODEN, WEEPING IN THE PLAYTIME OF OTHERS:
AMERICA's INCARCERATED CHILDREN (1976). An evaluation of Louisiana
training schools described institutions populated predominantly by black ju-
veniles whom guards regularly physically abused, kept in isolation for long
periods of time, restrained with handcuffs, and confined in "punitive" facilities
surrounded by high chain-link fences topped with coiled razor wire. See
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CHILDREN IN CONFINEMENT IN LOUISIANA 1, 20-23,
27-34 (1995); see also DALE PARENT ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT: JUVENILE DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS
FACILITIES 21-157 (1994) (describing endemic institutional overcrowding in
larger medium or maximum security facilities which confined inmates with
perimeter fences, locked internal security, or both). As states sentenced more
youths to juvenile institutions, they increased their prison-like character, re-
lied more extensively on fences and walls to maintain perimeter security, and
used surveillance equipment to provide internal security. See SNYDER &
SICKMUND, supra note 81, at 171-72.
164. See Feld, supra note 2, at 232-37. See generally PARENT ET AL., supra
note 163.
165. See PARENT ET AL., supra note 163, at 43-63.
166. See id. at 61-62; see also SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 81, at 170.
167. States confine more than three-quarters of all delinquents in public
training schools and institutions. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 81, at
165. Evaluation research indicates that incarcerating young offenders in
large, congregate juvenile institutions does not effectively rehabilitate and
may affirmatively harm them. See, e.g., BARTOLLAS ET AL., supra note 163, at
261; FELD, supra note 163, at 196-97; PETER W. GREENvOOD & FRANKLIN E.
ZIMRING, ONE MORE CHANCE: THE PURSUIT OF PROMISING INTERVENTION
STRATEGIES FOR CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS 40 (1985) (noting that most
training schools "fail to reform" and "make no appreciable reduction in the
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proponents of the traditional juvenile court continue their quest
for the elusive "rehabilitative" grail and offer literature re-
views, meta-analyses, or program descriptions that report that
some interventions produce positive effects on selected clients
under certain conditions. 168 Typically, positive treatment ef-
fects appear in small programs that provide an intensive and
integrated response to the multitude of problems that delin-
quent youths present. Favorable results occur primarily under
optimal conditions, for example, when mental health or other
non-juvenile correctional personnel provide services with high
treatment integrity in well-established programs. 169 Although
very high recidivism rates, on the order to 70 to 80 percent"); OFFICE OF THE
MINN. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES FOR JUVENILE
OFFENDERS 71-73 (1995) (reporting that the rates of recidivism at Minnesota
juvenile correctional facilities in 1985 and 1991 were between 53% and 77%);
JOHN C. STEIGER & CARY DIZON, REHABILITATION, RELEASE, AND REOFFEND-
ING: A REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL CAREERS OF THE DIVISION OF JUVENILE
REHABILITATION "CLASS OF 1982," at 8 (1991) (reporting that more than two
thirds (67.9%) of youths released from Washington juvenile facilities in 1982
reoffended within two years).
The recent changes in juvenile court sentencing legislation exacerbate the
deleterious side effects associated with institutional overcrowding. See Barry
Krisberg et al., The Watershed of Juvenile Justice Reform, 32 CRIME &
DELINQ. 5, 32-36 (1986). Youths confined under "get tough" sentencing laws
to long terms often comprise the most serious and chronic delinquent popula-
tion. See id. at 17-23. Yet the institutions that house them often suffer from
overcrowding, limited physical mobility, and inadequate program resources.
See generally PARENT ET AL., supra note 163. Overcrowding also contributes
to higher rates of inmate violence and suicide. See id. at 93-122. These juve-
nile correctional "warehouses" exhibit most of the negative features of adult
prisons and function as little more than youth prisons in which inmates "do
time." See GREENWOOD & ZIMRING, supra, at 40. Large custodial institutions
enable politicians to demonstrate their toughness, give the public a false sense
of security, provide employment for correctional personnel, and minimize the
demands placed on custodial staff to maintain institutional order, but they do
little to improve the life-chances of troubled youths. See BERNARD, supra note
27, at 178.
168. See, e.g., D.A. Andrews et al., Does Correctional Treatment Work?: A
Clinically Relevant and Psychologically Informed Meta-Analysis, 28
CRIMINOLOGY 369, 384 (1990) (describing positive effects when offenders re-
ceived clinically appropriate psychological treatment); Mark W. Lipsey, Juve-
nile Delinquent Treatment: A Meta-Analytic Inquiry into the Variability of Ef-
fects, in META-ANALYsIS FOR EXPLANATON: A CASEBOOK 97-98 (Thomas D.
Cook et al. eds., 1992) (reporting positive treatment effects in intensive inte-
grated programs); Albert R. Roberts & Michael J. Camasso, The Effects of Ju-
venile Offender Treatment Programs on Recidivism: A Meta-Analysis of 46
Studies, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 421, 437 (1991) (noting
positive treatment effects from family therapy).
169. See Mark W. Lipsey & David B. Wilson, Effective Intervention for Se-
rious Juvenile Offenders, in SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDERS:
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some programs appear successful for some juvenile under some
circumstances and may improve the life-chances of some young
offenders, most states do not routinely provide quality pro-
grams or services for delinquents generally. Rather, they con-
fine most delinquents in euphemistically-sanitized youth pris-
ons with fewer procedural safeguards than adults enjoy. Thus,
even if some model programs can reduce recidivism rates, pub-
lic officials appear unwilling to provide such treatment services
when they face fiscal constraints, budget deficits, and competi-
tion from other, more politically potent interest groups. Or-
ganizational imperatives to achieve "economies of scale" man-
date confining ever larger numbers of youths and thereby
preclude the possibility of matching offenders with appropriate
treatment programs.
IV. THE INHERENT CONTRADICTIONS OF THE
JUVENILE COURT
Juvenile courts punish rather than treat young offenders
and use a procedural regime under which no adult would con-
sent to be tried. The fundamental shortcoming of the juvenile
court's welfare idea reflects a failure of conception and not sim-
ply a century-long failure of implementation. The juvenile
court's creators envisioned a social service agency in a judicial
setting and attempted to fuse its welfare mission with the
power of state coercion. 70 Combining social welfare and penal
social control functions in one agency assures that juvenile
courts do both badly. Providing for child welfare is a societal
responsibility rather than a judicial one. Juvenile courts lack
control over the resources necessary to meet child welfare
needs exactly because of the social class and racial characteris-
tics of their clients, and the public's fear of "other people's chil-
dren."' 71 In practice, juvenile courts almost inevitably subordi-
nate child welfare concerns to crime control considerations.
If a state were to formulate child welfare policies writing
on a clean slate, would it choose a court as the most appropri-
ate agency through which to deliver social services and would it
make criminality a condition precedent to the receipt of serv-
RISK FACTORS AND SUCCESSFUL INTERVENTIONS 313, 325-38 (Rolf Loeber &
David Farrington eds., 1998); Jeffrey Fagan, Social and Legal Policy Dimen-
sions of Violent Juvenile Crime, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 93, 96-102 (1990).
170. See FELD, supra note 5, at 294-97.
171. See supra notes 16-33 and accompanying text (discussing inherent
discriminatory practices within the Progressive juvenile court).
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ices? If a state would not initially choose a court to deliver so-
cial services, then does the fact of a youth's criminality confer
upon the judiciary any special competency as a welfare agency?
Many young people who do not commit crimes desperately need
social services, and many youths who commit crimes do not re-
quire or will not respond to welfare programs. In short, crimi-
nality represents an inaccurate and haphazard criterion upon
which to allocate social services. Because our society denies
adequate help and assistance to meet the social welfare needs
of all young people, juvenile courts' treatment ideology serves
primarily to legitimize judicial coercion of some youths because
of their criminality.
The attempt to combine social welfare and criminal social
control in one agency constitutes the fundamental flaw of the
juvenile court. The juvenile court subordinates social welfare
concerns to criminal social control functions because of its in-
herently penal focus. Legislatures do not define juvenile court
jurisdiction on the basis of characteristics of children for which
they are not responsible and for which effective intervention
could improve their lives. For example, juvenile court law does
not define eligibility for welfare services or create an enforce-
able right or entitlement based upon young peoples' lack of ac-
cess to quality education, lack of adequate housing or nutrition,
unmet health needs, or impoverished families-none of which
are their fault. In all of these instances, children bear the bur-
dens of their parents' circumstances literally as innocent by-
standers. 7 2
Instead, states define juvenile court jurisdiction based on a
youth committing a crime, a prerequisite that detracts from a
compassionate response. Unlike disadvantaged social condi-
tions that are not their fault, criminal behavior represents the
one characteristic for which adolescent offenders do bear at
least partial responsibility. In short, juvenile courts define eli-
gibility for services on the basis of the feature least likely to
elicit sympathy and compassion and ignore the social structural
conditions or personal circumstances more likely to evoke a
greater desire to help. Juvenile courts' defining characteristic
strengthens public antipathy to "other people's children" by
emphasizing primarily that they are law violators. The recent
"criminological triage" policies that stress punishment, ac-
172. See GRUBB & LAZERSON, supra note 33, at 298-300; NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 86, at 48-56.
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countability, and personal responsibility further reinforce juve-
nile courts' penal foundations and reduce the legitimacy of
youths' claims to humanitarian assistance.
V. THE KID IS A CRIMINAL AND THE CRIMINAL IS A KID
The "real" reasons why states bring youths to juvenile
court is because they committed crimes, not because they need
social services. Accordingly, states should uncouple social wel-
fare from social control, try all offenders in one integrated
criminal justice system, and make appropriate substantive and
procedural modifications to accommodate the youthfulness of
some defendants. Substantive justice requires a rationale to
sentence younger offenders differently, and more leniently,
than older defendants, a formal recognition of youthfulness as a
mitigating factor. Procedural justice requires providing youths
with full procedural parity with adult defendants and addi-
tional safeguards to account for the disadvantage of youth in
the justice system. These substantive and procedural modifica-
tions can avoid the "worst of both worlds," provide youths with
protections functionally equivalent to those accorded adults,
and do justice in sentencing.173
My proposal to abolish juvenile courts constitutes neither
an unqualified endorsement of punishment nor a primitive
throw-back to earlier centuries' vision of children as miniature
adults. Rather, it honestly acknowledges that the real business
of juvenile courts is criminal social control, asserts that
younger offenders in a criminal justice system deserve less se-
vere penalties for their misdeeds than do more mature offend-
ers simply because they are young, and addresses many prob-
lems created by trying to maintain binary, dichotomous, and
contradictory criminal justice systems based on an arbitrary
age classification of a youth as a child or as an adult.174
Formulating a sentencing policy when the kid is a criminal
and the criminal is a kid entails two tasks: to develop a ration-
ale to sentence younger offenders more leniently than adult of-
fenders and to devise a practical mechanism to implement
173. See, e.g., FELD, supra note 5, at 302-27 (analyzing modifications of
criminal justice system necessary to accommodate younger offenders); Feld,
supra note 6, at 96-115 (rationalizing formal recognition of youthfulness as a
mitigating factor in sentencing younger offenders); Feld, Criminalizing Juve-
nile Justice, supra note 4, at 272-76 (comparing and contrasting juvenile and
criminal procedures and advocating greater procedural safeguards for youth).
174. See Feld, supra note 6, at 125-29.
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youthfulness as a mitigating factor in sentencing. Explicitly
punishing younger offenders rests on the premise that adoles-
cents possess sufficient moral reasoning, cognitive capacity,
and volitional control to hold them partially responsible for
their behavior, albeit not to the same degree as adults. Devel-
opmental psychology, jurisprudence, and criminal sentencing
policy provide rationale to formally recognize youthfulness as a
mitigating factor in sentencing.17 5 A "youth discount"--shorter
sentences for reduced responsibility-provides the practical
administrative mechanism to implement it.
The idea of deserved punishment entails censure and con-
demnation for making blameworthy choices, and imposes sanc-
tions proportional to the seriousness of a crime.1 76 Two ele-
ments-harm and culpability--define the seriousness of a
crime. A perpetrator's age has relatively little bearing on as-
sessments of harm-the nature of the injury inflicted, risk cre-
ated, or value taken. But evaluations of seriousness also impli-
cate the quality of the actor's choice to engage in the criminal
conduct that produced the harm. Responsibility for choices
hinges on cognitive and volitional competence. Youths differ
socially, physically, and psychologically from more mature
adults. They possess neither the rationality nor the self-control
to equate their criminal responsibility fully with that of adults.
Youths have not yet fully internalized moral norms, developed
sufficient empathic identification with others, acquired ade-
quate moral comprehension, or had sufficient opportunity to
develop the ability to restrain their actions.17 7 In short, their
immaturity affects the quality of their judgments in ways that
are relevant to criminal sentencing policy.
A. ADOLESCENCE AS A GENERIC FORM OF REDUCED
CULPABILITY
Certain characteristic developmental differences distin-
guish the quality of decisions that young people make from
those of- adults, justify a somewhat more protective stance
when states sentence younger offenders, and support a youth
sentencing policy that enables young offenders to survive the
mistakes of adolescence with their life chances intact. "Psycho-
175. See infra notes 178-87 and accompanying text.
176. See generally ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS (1993);
ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976).
177. See Feld, supra note 6, at 102-07.
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social maturity," "judgment," and "temperance" provide concep-
tual prisms through which to view adolescents' decision-making
competencies and to assess the quality of their choices. 178
Adolescents and adults differ in the quality of judgment and
self-control they exercise because of differences in breadth of
experience, short-term versus long-term temporal perspectives,
attitudes toward risk, impulsivity, and the importance attached
to peer influences. 179 These developmentally unique attributes
affect youths' degree of criminal responsibility. Young people
are more impulsive, exercise less self-control, fail adequately to
calculate long-term consequences and engage in more risky be-
havior than do adults.180 Adolescents may estimate the magni-
tude or probability of risks differently than adults, may use a
shorter time-frame, or focus on opportunities for gains rather
than possibilities of losses differently than adults.' 8 ' Young
people may discount the negative value of future consequences
because they have more difficulty than adults integrating a fu-
ture consequence into their more limited experiential base-
line. 8 2 Adolescents' quality of judgments differ from adults be-
cause of their predisposition toward sensation-seeking,
impulsivity related to hormonal or physiological changes, and
mood volatility. 8 3 Adolescents respond to peer group influ-
178. See generally Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, The Cogni-
tive and Affective Influences on Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMP. L. REV.
1763 (1995) [hereinafter Cauffman & Steinberg, Adolescent Decision-Making];
Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent Decisionmaking, 37
VILL. L. REV. 1607 (1992) [hereinafter Scott, Judgment and Reasoning]; Eliza-
beth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental
Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137
(1997); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in
Adolescence: Psycho-social Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 249 (1996) [hereinafter Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity of
Judgment].
179. See Lita Furby & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk Taking in Adolescence: A
Decision-Making Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 1, 3 (1992); Scott,
Judgement and Reasoning, supra note 178, at 1610; Steinberg & Cauffman,
Maturity of Judgment, supra note 178, at 252.
180. See William Gardner, A Life-Span Rational Choice Theory of Risk
Taking, in ADOLESCENT RISK TAKING 66, 67 (Nancy J. Bell & Robert W. Bell
eds., 1993); Scott, supra note 178, at 1642-52; Steinberg & Cauffman, supra
note 178, at 261-62.
181. See Scott, Judgment and Reasoning, supra note 178, at 1643-47.
182. See William Gardner & Janna Herman, Adolescents' AIDS Risk Tak-
ing: A Rational Choice Perspective, in NEW DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD
DEVELOPMENT 17, 25-26 (William Gardner et al. eds., 1990).
183. See, e.g., Cauffman & Steinberg, Adolescent Decision-Making, supra
note 178, at 1780; Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment, supra note
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ences more readily than do adults because of the crucial role
that peer relationships play in identity formation. 184 Most
adolescent crime occurs in a group context, and having delin-
quent friends precedes an adolescent's own criminal involve-
ment.185 Group-offending places normally law-abiding youth at
greater risk of involvement and reduces their ability publicly to
withdraw. Because of the social context of adolescent crime,
young people require time, experience, and opportunities to de-
velop the capacity for autonomous judgments and to resist peer
influence.
Developmental processes affect adolescents' quality of
judgment and self-control, directly influence their degree of
criminal responsibility and deserved punishment, and justify a
different criminal sentencing policy. While young offenders
possess sufficient understanding and culpability to hold them
accountable for their acts, their crimes are less blameworthy
than adults' because of reduced culpability and limited appre-
ciation of consequences and because their life-circumstances
understandably limited their capacity to learn to make fully re-
sponsible choices.
When youths offend, the families, schools, and communi-
ties that socialize them bear some responsibility for the failures
of those socializing institutions. Human beings depend upon
others to nurture them and to enable them to develop and exer-
cise the moral capacity for constructive behavior. The capacity
for self-control and self-direction is not simply a matter of
178, at 258-62.
184. See ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 78-81; Scott, Judgment and Reasoning,
supra note 178, at 1643-44. Franklin Zimring notes the crucial role of "group
offending" in adolescents' decisions to engage in crime:
The ability to resist peer pressure is yet another social skill that is a
necessary part of legal obedience and is not fully developed in many
adolescents.... Most adolescent decisions to break the law or not
take place on a social stage where the immediate pressure of peers
urging the'adolescent on is often the real motive for most teenage
crime.
Franklin Zimring, Toward Jurisprudence of Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST.
477, 488 (1998).
185. See Delbert S. Elliott & Scott Menard, Delinquent Friends and Delin-
quent Behavior: Temporal and Developmental Patterns, in DELINQUENCY AND
CRIME: CURRENT THEORIEs (J. David Hawkins ed., 1996); see also Zimring,
supra note 184, at 490 (characterizing the tendency of the "You're Chicken" or
"I Dare You" reason as why "young persons who would not commit crimes
alone do so in groups. 'I dare you' is the reason that 'having delinquent
friends' both precedes an adolescent's own involvement in violence and is a
strong predictor of future violence").
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moral luck or good fortune, but a socially constructed develop-
mental process that provides young people with the opportunity
to develop a moral character.'8 6 Community structures affect
social conditions and the contexts within which adolescents
grow and interact with peers. Unlike presumptively mobile
adults, because of their dependency juveniles lack the means or
ability to escape from their criminogenic environments. Be-
cause the ability to make responsible choices is learned,
187
young peoples' socially constructed life situation understanda-
bly limits their capacity to develop self-control, restricts their
opportunities to learn and to exercise responsibility, and sup-
ports a partial reduction of criminal responsibility.
B. "YOUTH DISCOUNT"
The binary distinctions between children and adults that
provide the bases for states' legal age of majority and the juris-
prudential foundation of the juvenile court ignore the reality
that adolescents develop along a continuum, and create an un-
fortunate either-or forced choice in sentencing. By contrast,
shorter sentences for reduced responsibility represent a more
modest and readily attainable reason to treat young offenders
differently than adults than the rehabilitative justifications ad-
vanced by Progressive "child-savers." Protecting young people
from the full penal consequences of their poor decisions reflects
a policy to preserve their life chances for the future when they
presumably will make more mature and responsible choices.
Sentencing policy that integrates youthfulness, reduced
culpability, and restricted opportunities to learn self-control
with penal principles of proportionality would provide younger
offenders with categorical fractional reductions of adult sen-
tences. Because youthfulness constitutes a universal form of
"reduced culpability" or "diminished responsibility," states
should treat it categorically as a mitigating factor without re-
gard to nuances of individual developmental differences. Youth
development is a highly variable process, and chronological age
is a crude, imprecise measure of criminal maturity and the ca-
pacity for self-control. Despite the variability of adolescence,
however, a categorical "youth discount" that uses age as a con-
186. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW
AMERIcAN AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 343-66 (1991).
187. See Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment, supra note 178, at
252-67 (discussing how adolescents develop responsibility and perspective).
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clusive proxy for reduced culpability and shorter sentences re-
mains preferable to any individualized inquiry into the crimi-
nal responsibility of each young offender. Developmental psy-
chology lacks reliable indicators of moral development that
equate readily with criminal responsibility and accountability;
clinical testimony to precisely tailor sanctions to culpability is
not worth the burden or diversion of resources that the effort
would entail. 88 Youthful mitigated criminal responsibility is a
legal concept; a youth discount categorically recognizes that
criminal choices that young people make differ to some degree
qualitatively from those of adults.
Because adolescence constitutes a form of "reduced culpa-
bility" and young people make criminal choices that differ to
some degree qualitatively from those of adults, an explicit
"youth discount" at sentencing incorporates this sliding scale of
criminal responsibility. A fourteen-year-old offender might re-
ceive, for example, 25% to 33% of the adult penalty; a sixteen-
year-old defendant, 50% to 66%; and an eighteen-year old adult
the full penalty as presently occurs.189 The "deeper discounts"
for younger offenders correspond to the developmental contin-
uum and their more limited opportunities to learn to be respon-
sible and to exercise self-control. Because reduced culpability
provides the rationale for youthful mitigation, younger adoles-
cents bear less responsibility and deserve proportionally
shorter sentences than older youths. With the passage of time,
age, and opportunities to develop the capacity for self-control,
social tolerance of criminal deviance and claims for youthful
mitigation decline.
Discounted sentences that preserve younger offenders' life
chances require that the maximum sentences that they receive
remain substantially lower than those imposed on adults.
Capital sentences and draconian mandatory minimum sen-
tences, for example, life without parole, have no place in sen-
188. I have noted that:
[a]ttempts to integrate subjective psychological explanations of ado-
lescent behavior and personal responsibility into a youth sentencing
policy cannot be done in a way that can be administered fairly with-
out undermining the objectivity of the law.... For young criminal ac-
tors who possess at least some degree of criminal responsibility, re-
lying on inherently inconclusive or contradictory psychiatric or
clinical testimony to precisely tailor sanctions hardly seems worth thejudicial burden and diversion of resources that the effort would entail.
FELD, supra note 5, at 320.
189. See, e.g., id. at 315-27; Feld, supra note 6, at 115-23; Feld, Punish-
ment, Treatment, supra note 4, at 896-902.
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tencing presumptively less-blameworthy adolescents. Because
of the rapidity of adolescent development and the life-course
disruptive consequences of incarceration, the rationale for a
"youth discount" also supports requiring a higher in/out
threshold of offense seriousness and culpability as a prerequi-
site for imprisonment. Only states whose criminal sentencing
laws provide realistic, humane, and determinate sentences that
enable a judge actually to determine "real-time" sentences can
readily implement a proposal for explicit fractional reductions
of youths' sentences. One can only know the value of a "youth
discount" in a sentencing system in which courts know in ad-
vance the standard or "going rate" for adults.
C. VIRTUES OF AN INTEGRATED CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
A graduated age-culpability sentencing scheme in an inte-
grated criminal justice system avoids the inconsistencies asso-
ciated with the binary either-juvenile-or-adult drama currently
played out in judicial waiver proceedings and in prosecutorial
charging decisions and introduces proportionality to the sen-
tences imposed on the many youths currently tried as adults.
It also avoids the "punishment gap" when youths make the
transition from one justice system to the other, and assures
similar consequences for similarly-situated offenders. Adoles-
cence and criminal careers develop along a continuum; the cur-
rent bifurcation between the two justice systems confounds ef-
forts to respond consistently to young career offenders. A
sliding-scale of criminal sentences based on an offender's age-
as-a-proxy-for-culpability accomplishes simply and directly
what the various "blended jurisdiction" statutes attempt to
achieve indirectly. 190 A formal policy of youthfulness as a miti-
gating factor avoids the undesirable forced choice between ei-
ther inflicting undeservedly harsh penalties on less culpable
actors or doing nothing about the manifestly guilty.
An integrated justice system also allows for integrated rec-
ord-keeping and enables officials to identify and respond to ca-
reer offenders more readily than the current jurisdictional bi-
furcation permits. Even adolescent "career offenders" deserve
enhanced sentences based on an extensive record of prior of-
fending. But an integrated justice system does not require in-
tegrated prisons. The question of "how long" differs from ques-
tions of "where" and "what." States should maintain age
190. See Feld, supra note 2, at 239-43; Feld, supra note 73, at 1038-51.
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segregated youth correctional facilities both to protect younger
offenders from adults and to protect geriatric prisoners from
younger inmates. Because all young offenders eventually will
return to society, a sentencing and correctional policy must of-
fer youths "room to reform" and provide the opportunities and
resources to enable them to do so.
Finally, affirming partial responsibility for youth consti-
tutes a virtue. The idea of personal responsibility and account-
ability for behavior provides an important cultural counter-
weight to a popular culture that endorses the idea that every-
one is a victim, that all behavior is determined, and that no one
is responsible. The juvenile court elevated determinism over
freewill, characterized delinquents as victims rather than per-
petrators, and subjected them to an indeterminate quasi-civil
commitment process. The juvenile court's treatment ideology
denied youths' personal responsibility, reduced offenders' duty
to exercise self-control, and eroded their obligations to change.
If there is any silver lining in the current cloud of "get tough"
policies, it is the affirmation of responsibility. A culture that
values autonomous individuals must emphasize both freedom
and responsibility. A criminal law that bases sentences on
blameworthiness and responsibility must recognize the physi-
cal, psychological, and socially constructed differences between
youths and adults. Affirming responsibility forces politicians to
be honest when the kid is a criminal and the criminal is a kid.
The real reason states bring young offenders to juvenile courts
is not to deliver social services, but because they committed a
crime.
EPILOGUE-UNCOUPLING SOCIAL WELFARE FROM
SOCIAL CONTROL
A proposal to abolish the juvenile court represents an effort
to uncouple social welfare and social control policies. On the
one hand, such an endeavor would provoke a re-examination of
criminal justice strategies when the kid is a criminal and the
criminal is a kid. On the other hand, such a strategy would en-
able public policies to address directly the "real needs" of all
children regardless of their criminality. Social structural
forces, political economic arrangements, and legal policies af-
fect the social conditions of young people. A century ago, Pro-
gressive reformers had to choose between initiating structural
social reforms that would ameliorate criminogenic forces or
ministering to the individuals damaged by those adverse social
390 [Vol. 84:327
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conditions. Driven by class and ethnic antagonisms, they ig-
nored the social-structural implications of their delinquency
theories and chose instead to "save children" and, incidentally,
to preserve their own power and privilege. 191
A century later, we face the same choice between "rehabili-
tating" damaged individuals and initiating social structural
changes. In making this choice, the juvenile court welfare idea
may constitute an obstacle to child welfare reform and an alibi
to avoid fundamental changes. Conservatives deprecate the ju-
venile court as a welfare system, albeit one that "coddles"
criminals, while liberals bemoan its lack of resources and in-
adequate options. A society that cares for the welfare of its
children does so directly by supporting families, communities,
schools, and social institutions that nurture all young people,
and not by cynically incarcerating its most disadvantaged chil-
dren and pretending that it is "for their own good." It is unre-
alistic to expect juvenile courts or any other justice institutions
to ameliorate the social ills that affect young people or to sig-
nificantly reduce youth crime. 192
The social order significantly determines young peoples'
access to opportunities and the lives they may fashion for
themselves as adults. A society committed to equality of oppor-
tunity must adopt policies to assure that all children, regard-
less of their parents' socio-economic circumstances, have at
least a fair start and a meaningful chance to succeed. Current
public policies contribute to the social isolation of many youths,
the desperate poverty of more than one child in five, and the
high rates of criminality that prevail among young people in
general and urban black males in particular. 193 Public policies
191. See FELD, supra note 5, at 75-78; PLA'T, supra note 11, at 176-81;
ROTM AN, supra note 11, at 10.
192. TONRY, supra note 62, at 163, observed that:
[t]he resources of the criminal justice system are few. The answers to
poverty, underemployment, and racial bias must be sought elsewhere,
in schools and social welfare programs and broad-based social poli-
cies. To look to the criminal justice system to solve fundamental so-
cial problems would be foolish and doomed to fail.
Similarly, I have observed that:
[s]ocial welfare and legal policies to provide all young people with a
hopeful future, to reduce racial and social inequality, and to remove
guns from the hands of children require a public and political com-
mitment to the welfare of children that extends far beyond the re-
sources and competencies of anyjuvenile justice system.
FELD, supra note 5, at 342.
193. See WILSON, supra note 89, at 91-94; see also DUNCAN LINDSEY, THE
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can modify the social order, improve the present circumstances
of young people, and better facilitate their successful transition
to responsible and competent adulthood.
If states frame child welfare policies in terms of child wel-
fare rather than crime control, then the possibilities for positive
interventions for young people expand dramatically. For ex-
ample, a public health approach to youth crime and violence
that identified their social, environmental, community struc-
tural, and ecological correlates such as concentrated poverty,
school test-scores, availability of handguns or shots-fired, or the
commercialization of violence would suggest wholly different
intervention strategies than simply incarcerating minority
youths. Youth violence occurs as part of a social ecological
structure in areas of concentrated poverty, high teenage preg-
nancy, and welfare dependency. Such social indicators could
identify census tracts or even zip codes for community organ-
izing, economic development, and preventive and remedial in-
tervention.
Poverty constitutes the biggest single risk factor for the
welfare of young people.194 Family income directly affects the
WELFARE OF CHILDREN 185-228 (1994); NATIONAL COMM'N ON CHILDREN, su-
pra note 186, at 281-309
194. "[Tlhe diverse ways in which poverty harms children and adolescents,
inflicts lasting damage, and limits their future potential points to the reduc-
tion of poverty as a key step toward improving the condition of many of the
nation's youths." NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 86, at 236.
More children live in poverty in the United States, one in five, than in any
other western industrialized nation. See SYNDER & SICKMUND, supra note 81,
at 7. Recent comparisons reveal that the rate of child poverty in the United
States (20.4%) is more than double that of Canada (9.3%) and Australia
(9.0%), and four to eight times greater than that of western European indus-
trial democracies such as France (4.6%), Germany (2.8%) or Sweden (1.6%).
See LINDSEY, supra note 193, at 222. According to the National Commission
on Children:
children are the poorest Americans. One in five lives in a family with
an income below the federal poverty level. One in four infants and
toddlers under the age of three is poor. Nearly 13 million children
live in poverty, more than 2 million more than a decade ago. Many of
these children are desperately poor; nearly 5 million live in families
with incomes less than half the federal poverty level.
NATIONAL COMM'N ON CHILDREN, supra note 186, at 24. Children comprise
the largest age group in poverty and, as a result of macro-structural economic
changes and family demographic forces since the 1970s, their situation has
worsened. See KATZ, supra note 49, at 126-27. While 15% of children lived
below the poverty line in 1974, by 1986, 21% of children did, a 40% increase.
See id. at 127. Among the impoverished young, minority children dispropor-
tionately experience the most dire penury and personal circumstances. See id.
As the international comparisons indicate, in an affluent society like the
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quality of children's lives and their social opportunities in
myriad ways-the quality of their housing, neighborhoods,
schools, health care, nutrition, and personal safety. Children in
poverty experience malnutrition, inadequate clothing, substan-
dard housing, lack of access to health care, deficient schools,
and dangerous crime-ridden streets and neighborhoods. 195 In
an affluent society, children consigned to live in prolonged pov-
erty suffer from a form of chronic abuse. Eliminating this per-
vasive, undifferentiated child abuse requires far more extensive
social resources and economic reforms than any juvenile justice
or child welfare system possibly can muster.
The social and community structural determinants of
youth crime and violence also suggest several future directions
for a child welfare policy freed from the constraints of a juve-
nile court. Because poverty constitutes the biggest single risk
factor for youth development, public policies must address di-
rectly child poverty to facilitate youths' transition to adulthood.
Because minority children disproportionately bear the brunt of
economic inequality, universal child welfare policies will espe-
cially enhance their life chances. 196 Because the sharp increase
in homicides caused by firearms provided most of the political
impetus to transform the juvenile court into a scale-down
criminal court and to "crack down" on youth crime, public poli-
cies must address directly the prevalence of guns among the
young.
Three aspects of youth crime and violence suggest future
social welfare policy directions regardless of their immediate
impact on recidivism. First, it is imperative to provide a hopeful
future for all young people. As a result of structural and eco-
nomic changes since the 1980s, the ability of families to raise
children, to prepare them for the transition to adulthood, and
to provide them with a more promising future has declined.
United States, the political economy, rather than natural scarcity, allocates
resources; public policies produce social and economic inequalities and concen-
trated poverty. The growth in child poverty over the past two decades reflects
deliberate policies to prefer certain interests groups and classes, for example,
the elderly and wealthy, over others groups such as the young, the poor, or
families raising children. See LINDSEY, supra note 193, at 197-228. The
structure of the tax, health care, anti-discrimination, housing, minimum wage,
child-care, employment, and macro-economic policies all comprise components
of a child welfare and "family policy" and affect parents' ability to raise their
children. See NATIONAL COMA'N ON CHILDREN, supra note 186, at 249-79.
195. See NATIONAL COMA'N ON CHILDREN, supra note 186, at 28-37.
196. See WILSON, supra note 89, at 128-39.
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Many social indicators of the status of young people-poverty,
homelessness, violent victimization, and crime-are negative
and some of those adverse trends are accelerating. Without re-
alistic hope for their future, young people fall into despair, ni-
hilism, and violence. Second, the disproportionate over-
representation of minority youths in the juvenile justice system
forces us to confront the issue of race in American society and
makes imperative the pursuit of racial and social justice. The
increasing and explicit punitiveness of juvenile justice policies
emerge against the backdrop of the structural transformation
of cities, the deindustrialization of the urban core, and the
emergence of a threatening black urban "underclass" living in
racial isolation and concentrated poverty. A generation ago,
the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, The
Kerner Commission, warned that the United States was "mov-
ing toward two societies, one black, one white-separate and
unequal."197 The Kerner Commission predicted that "to con-
tinue present policies [will] make permanent the division of our
country into two societies; one, largely Negro and poor, located
in the central cities; the other, predominantly white and afflu-
ent, located in the suburbs."198 Today, we reap the bitter har-
vest of racial segregation, concentrated poverty, urban social
disintegration, and youth violence sown by social policies and
public neglect a generation ago. 199 Third, youth violence has
become increasingly lethal as the proliferation of handguns
transforms adolescent altercations into homicidal encounters.
Only public policies that reduce and reverse the proliferation of
guns among the youth population will stem the carnage.
While politicians may be unwilling to invest scarce social
resources in young "criminals," particularly those of other col-
ors or cultures, a demographic shift and an aging population
give all of us a stake in young people and encourage us to in-
vest in their human capital for their and our own future well-
being and to maintain an inter-generational compact. Social
welfare and legal policies to provide all young people with a
hopeful future, to reduce racial and social inequality, and to re-
duce access to and use of firearms require a public and political
197. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 55, at
1.
198. Id. at 22.
199. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 38, at 137-39; WILSON, supra note
89, at 21-26.
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commitment to the welfare of children that extends far beyond
the resources or competencies of any juvenile justice system.

